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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2003 marks the twentieth anniversary of the 1983
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ("Civil Rule 11"),
the frivolous conduct sanctions rule, which was first promulgated
without teeth in 1937, as well as the tenth anniversary of the 1993
amendments to the rule, which greatly refined the procedure and
remedies available there under.' The year 2003 also marks the twen-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1937-1993).
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tieth anniversary of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), which were first
promulgated in 1983, and which have been adopted by most of the
states.2 The Model Rules replaced the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility ("Model Code"), which was first promulgated
in 1969.'
Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 was the analog to the 1937
version of Civil Rule 11, and they were both measured by a largely
unenforceable subjective standard.4 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 was the
"representing the client within the bounds of the law" rule,5 and it
will be discussed in brief below. 6 Model Rule 3.1 is the primary ana-
log to the amended versions of Civil Rule 11, and they are both now
measured by an objective standard that is designed to be more en-
forceable. 7 Model Rule 3.1 is the "meritorious claims and conten-
tions" rule,8 and it will be discussed in detail below along with the
other Model Rules that impact litigation, which are all subsumed
within Civil Rule 11.9
Civil Rule 11 was adopted on December 20, 1937, but it did not be-
come effective until September 16, 1938. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3181 (2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2003). Some writers refer to the
original rule as the 1938 version, but since the advisory committee note to the
original version is dated 1937, the author finds this confusing and thus refers to
the original version as the 1937 version. All later amendments of Civil Rule
11 were effective in the year that they were adopted.
2. As of September 30, 2003, the Model Rules have been adopted by
forty-five states. LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 01:3-:08 (ABA/BNA)
(2003). For a discussion of any differences between the Model Rules and the
various states' adoption of the same, see id. at 01: 11-:68.
3. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT preface (2003) (describing the ABA's
historical involvement in legal ethics and professional responsibility).
4. See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A.B.A., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 1982-1998, at 163-64 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RULES HISTORY]
(discussing history of Model Rule 3.1 and comparison with DR 7-102).
5. MODEL CODE PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
6. See infra notes 46, 48, 50 & 52.
7. See MODEL RULES HISTORY, supra note 4, at 163-64.
8. MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003).
9. See infra Part II.
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The purpose of this Article is to explore the apparent disconnect
between Model Rule 3.1 and Civil Rule 11;10 to explain why this has
occurred and whether it has been beneficial;" and to suggest that,
with the culmination of Ethics 2000 and the concomitant 2002
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,' 2 the inte-
gration of legal ethics and professional responsibility with Civil Rule
11 should be examined as part of a total system of attorney regula-
tion.
13
By way of introduction to this disconnect between Model Rule
3.1 and Civil Rule 11, in his seminal 1982 article, Professor Richard
H. Underwood captured and explained the zeitgeist of the litigation
environment that existed before, and which gave rise to, these 1983
rules, to wit:
To further the end that no man be denied justice, modem
procedural reforms have emphasized the simplification of
pleadings and the expansion of pretrial discovery. Al-
though these reforms generally are lauded as advancing the
public policy favoring free access to the courts, they have
opened the door to substantial abuse of the litigation proc-
ess. Observing the pernicious effects of unbridled discov-
ery in the hands of lawyers, Justice Powell has noted that
"[1]awyers devote an enormous number of 'chargeable
hours' to the practice of discovery... all too often... ena-
bling the party with greater financial resources to prevail by
exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent." Clients
may exacerbate this abuse, often entering the fray of litiga-
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Parts VI & VII.
12. See The 2002 Changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, supplementing ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
These 2002 changes resulted from the work of the ABA Commission
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion"), the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice ("MWP Commis-
sion"), and the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility ("Ethics Committee"). Id. For a discussion of how these entities fit
into the development of the Model Rules, see ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, su-
pra, preface, at vii-viii.
13. See infra Parts VIII-X.
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tion indifferent to the burdens it may impose on others. Not
surprisingly, cases arise in which neither the plaintiff nor
his counsel has reasonable grounds for initiating the litiga-
tion, but have proceeded simply in the hope that some basis
for suit may materialize during discovery. Similarly, de-
fendants often succumb to the temptations of liberal plead-
ing and discovery rules, asserting sham defenses and coun-
terclaims, and filing flurries of motions in the hope of
discouraging the plaintiff and delaying a judgment.
For the most part, courts have eschewed any role in these
pre-trial adversarial battles. Indeed, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure specifically contemplate minimal judicial
intervention at the discovery stage. Consequently, counsel
are free to file "shotgun" complaints, to assert and explore
all conceivable claims and defenses-to leave no stone un-
turned during discovery. The crushing burden on litigants
and the courts which results when this system is exploited
frequently culminates in a denial of justice.
In response to the flood of unchecked litigation abuse, in-
tense pressures currently are being exerted on the legal pro-
fession for procedural and ethical reform. One manifesta-
tion of this is the proliferation of malicious prosecution
actions against trial counsel. Within the profession, an
[ABA] committee has labored to secure approval of a com-
prehensive revision of the [Model] Code of Professional
Responsibility, including certain [M]odel [R]ules specifi-
cally addressed to counsel's duty to expedite litigation and
refrain from vexatious conduct. Additionally, the Judicial
Conference of the United States has adopted yet another set
of proposals for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, aimed at curbing abuses in pleading, motion prac-
tice and discovery.'
4
14. Richard H. Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of
Adversary Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 625, 626-
29 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Underwood's article further:
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After surveying the topics of groundless litigation and delay,
among other topics, Professor Underwood explained that:
Although there is considerable doubt regarding whether
the [M]odel [R]ules will gain the support of the bar, they
have provided secondary authority for the formulation of a
more objective standard of culpability governing the impo-
sition of... sanctions in the federal courts. Moreover, the
emphasis throughout the [M]odel [R]ules upon balancing
the legitimate interests of the client against the resultant de-
lay has been carried forward in the proposed amendments
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11 and 26. By allow-
ing trial judges to determine whether a litigant's legitimate
nondelay interests outweigh the delay which would accom-
pany the particular motion or request, these provisions
should encourage trial judges to sanction errant counsel
with greater frequency and thus deter the abusive practices
that, previously, often went unpunished. 5
[A]ddresse[d] the effectiveness of these recent developments and pro-
posals, and discusse[d] them in the context of [then-] recent opinions
illustrating the power of the trial judge to control the excesses of the
adversary system. It reject[ed] the countersuit as a time-consuming
and costly means of controlling litigation abuses, and [it] conclude[d]
that "tinkering changes" in the rules of procedure cannot bring about
true reform. It... urged... that the burden resulting from abuse of
litigation can only be relieved by changes which foster stronger judi-
cial control of adversarial ethics, and greater judicial involvement in
the pretrial stages of litigation. Any proposed change or reform, there-
fore, [should be] evaluated from the perspective of whether the change
will encourage trial judges to act resolutely in sanctioning errant coun-
sel, without simultaneously producing a chilling effect on zealous ad-
vocacy.
Id. at 629 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Underwood has remained one of the leading commentators on
litigation ethics. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK: THE LIMITS OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY (2d ed.
2001 & Supp. 2003).
15. Underwood, supra note 14, at 668 (footnote omitted). See also Neal H.
Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by
Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 300-01 & n.5
(1986) ("Amended Rule 11 was part of a broader reform effort aimed at pre-
venting abuse of the judicial system, especially by attorneys. Rule 11 empha-
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This description of the pre-1983 litigation context and the result-
ing 1983 rules is offered to highlight that these rules were influenced
by and emerged from the same intellectual discussion and for interre-
lated purposes, as succinctly explained by Professor Underwood.1
6
During the same time period, the intellectual discussion on this
topic was being driven by the reality that the disciplinary process had
ill-served the litigation arena in regards to frivolous conduct, be-
cause:
Attorneys can be disciplined for dilatory and abusive
practices by their respective local bar associations. Under
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney
has a duty not to delay a trial or act in any manner which
would injure another. Furthermore, groundless or frivolous
suits are prohibited. ....
The problem with... sanctions being enforced by the bar
is that they are extra-judicial in most cases and they do not
provide restitution to the party injured by the delay in the
litigation. Although local federal court rules often stipulate
that attorneys admitted to practice before them are subject
to the Model [Code of Professional Responsibility Discipli-
nary] Rules, the sanctions available are not frequently
sought. More often the local bar is responsible for disci-
plining attorneys for unprofessional conduct. Usually only
serious breaches of conduct warrant disbarment; and the de-
terrence value of other sanctions available through the bar
is questionable. For the most part, attorneys and judges are
reluctant to punish fellow members of their profession.
When attorneys are sanctioned by the bar, the party injured
by the improper conduct is not compensated. Although the
bar can censure and fine attorneys, the infrequency with
sizes an attorney's public duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the at-
torney's private duty to represent a client's interest zealously." Also, "Rules
16 and 26(g) were amended concurrently with Rule I 1" to deal with frivolous
conduct at pre-trial conferences and during discovery. (footnote omitted)).
16. For a discussion of the development and history of these rules, compare
GEORGENE M. VAiRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS chs. 1 & 2 (Richard G. Johnson
ed., 3d ed. 2004) (discussing history of Civil Rule 11), with MODEL RULES
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 163--64 (discussing history of Model Rule 3.1).
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which the bar imposes these sanctions makes them weak
deterrents. The sanctions imposed by the bar do not ade-
quately deter future dilatory practices, because they are not
utilized frequently. Furthermore, although the sanctions
penalize the attorney, justice is not served because the sanc-
tions themselves do not make the injured party "whole."'
17
The challenge during this time period was to bridge the gap be-
tween the original 1937 version of Civil Rule 11 and the then-current
1980 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 by creating a mechanism whereby a
trial court could both enforce litigation ethics and make the injured
party whole, and this challenge resulted in the 1983 version of Civil
Rule 11. Thus:
Among the more notable changes are the proposed amend-
ments to Rules 7 and 11, which deal with motion and plead-
ing practice. These changes have been proposed in re-
sponse to appeals for the reform of motion and pleading
practice to deter dilatory and abusive tactics in litigation.
This deterrence would be achieved through the imposition
of sanctions. More significantly, however, is that the pro-
posed amendments authorized the award of reasonable at-
torney's fees incurred as a result of abusive delaying tac-
tics.,
As explained later by Professor Judith A. McMorrow, the im-
pact of this bridge between legal ethics and professional responsibil-
ity on the one hand and litigation conduct on the other was the be-
ginning of the federalization of litigation ethics, to wit:
[P]ersuasive federalism is currently at work in the area of
lawyer ethics. Traditionally, state courts have been the
primary source for regulating lawyers and articulating stan-
17. Francis X. Buckley, Jr., Comment, Deterring Dilatory Tactics in Litiga-
tion: Proposed Amendments to Rules 7 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 26 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 895, 896-97 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
18. Id. at 895 (footnotes omitted). See also VAIRO, supra note 16, § 1.05
(discussing the 1983 amendments to Rule 11).
As additional background regarding this pre-1983-amendment time-
frame, the vexatious litigator statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, was amended in 1980
to allow for the imposition of costs, attorney's fees, and expenses, as sanctions
for certain frivolous conduct. See generally VAIRO, supra note 16,
§ 12.03[a][2] (discussing history and purpose of section 1927).
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dards of legal ethics. Although federal courts have asserted
inherent power to regulate the attorneys before them in the
past, they have not been the dominant voice in defining the
lawyer's role in our adversary system. When the Supreme
Court amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 in
1983, it gave federal district courts express authority to take
greater control over the conduct of attorneys appearing in
federal court. Despite its application solely to cases before
federal courts, Rule 11 has begun to change the discussion
about what constitutes proper attorney conduct.
The question of proper attorney conduct is bound up with
the question of the attorney's role in the adversary system.
.. [C]hanges in ethical requirements for lawyers result in
subtle shifts in the balance of lawyers' obligations to them-
selves, to their clients, and to society. As Rule 11 becomes
the focus of discussion, it emerges as a vehicle to federalize
our vision of an attorney's proper role in the adversary sys-
tem.
The Model Code and the Model Rules have a strong cli-
ent-centered focus, coupled with a heavy dose of self-
protection. But Rule 11 is subtly changing this client-
dominated approach. Perhaps this changed relationship is
indeed a better balance among lawyer, client, and society.
It is happening, however, largely through an adversarial
model developed by federal courts rather than through law-
yers' self-developed standards or through a process de-
signed to have greater meaningful public input. Rule 11
may be emerging as a method for federal judges "to mold
the bar in their own image." 19
Judge William W Schwarzer, an influential and early commen-
tator on Civil Rule 11, had earlier provided a foundation for Profes-
19. Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991
BYU L. REv. 959, 959-60, 975 (footnotes omitted).
Professor McMorrow has remained one of the leading commentators on
litigation ethics. See, e.g., JUDITH A. MCMORROw & DANIEL R.
COQUILLETrE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE: THE FEDERAL LAW OF ATTOR-
NEY CONDUCT (2001).
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sor McMorrow's point: "Rule 11, in focusing on the professional re-
sponsibilities of lawyers, also vests in the federal courts greatly
enlarged powers and obligations to enforce those responsibilities. ' z
Judge Schwarzer had also noted that:
The profession has, however, long recognized limits to
zealous advocacy. While these limits are not marked by
bright lines, the lawyer's concurrent obligations as an offi-
cer of the court have been repeatedly and clearly articu-
lated. In the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association, lawyers were enjoined from
advancing a claim or defense not warranted by existing law
or a good-faith argument for its extension, modification or
reversal, and from pursuing an action that would serve
merely to harass another. Under the 1983 ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are barred from as-
serting frivolous claims or defenses. These pronounce-
ments reflect a substantial consensus of the profession and
place a gloss on Rule 11.21
20. William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule ]1-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 204 (1985).
21. Id. at 189-90 (footnotes omitted).
Judge Schwarzer had added that the duty of candor is a "settled princi-
ple[] explicitly or implicitly acknowledged in the ABA's Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct." Id. at 193 (footnote omitted).
Which came first, the chicken or the egg, has been debated within the
Civil Rule 11 context to some degree. For instance, one authoritative practice
guide and reporting service has stated that "Model Rule 3.1 requires a lawyer
to have a basis that is 'not frivolous' for any claim, defense, or contention in a
proceeding. The 'not frivolous' standard was adopted to track the standard
generally used in the law of procedure." LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
61:106 (ABA/BNA) (1999) (citing THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 119 (1987) (comments of the reporter, Professor
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.)). On the other hand, Professor Underwood has noted
that "the emphasis throughout the [M]odel [R]ules upon balancing the legiti-
mate interests of the client against the resultant delay has been carried forward
in the proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11 and 26."
Underwood, supra note 14, at 668. Since the development of these rules took
several years, there was probably a lot of cross-fertilization going on, and it is
most likely not subject to proof at this time as to which came first.
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However, the federalism of litigation ethics envisioned by Pro-
fessor McMorrow never fully materialized, and it is still under de-
bate, 22 because the federal courts ostensibly interpreted the 1983 ver-
sion of Civil Rule 11 as creating a standard of care (negligence
standard) instead of a code of conduct (breach of fiduciary duty stan-
dard), among other reasons to be discussed below.23
For instance, in the leading case of Hays v. Sony Corp. of Amer-
ica,24 the Seventh Circuit explained that by:
Restating the standard in negligence terms helps one to see
that Rule 11 defines a new form of legal malpractice, and
there is thus no more reason for a competent attorney to
fear being sanctioned under Rule 11 than to fear being pun-
ished for any other form of malpractice. The difference is
merely in the victim. In the ordinary case of legal malprac-
tice the victim is the lawyer's client. . . . In the Rule 11 set-
ting the victims are the lawyer's adversary, other litigants in
the court's queue, and the court itself. By asserting claims
without first inquiring whether they have a plausible
grounding in law and fact, a lawyer can impose on an ad-
versary and on the judicial system substantial costs that
would have been-and should have been-avoided by a
reasonable prepleading inquiry.25
But, at the same time as the federal courts were using this mal-
practice/negligence analogy, and the resulting "reasonably competent
attorney" objective test, they were, in fact, creating a strict liability
22. See infra Parts V & VI.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
25. Id. at 418-19. See Lee Ann Pizzimenti, Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Re-
ject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1561, 1561-90 (1980) (discuss-
ing the ineffectiveness of abuse of process and malicious prosecution lawsuits,
payment of court costs, and discipline by the bar, for frivolous conduct; pro-
posing that privity in legal malpractice lawsuits be relaxed, and that the duty of
care be expanded, in order to allow such suits by victims of frivolous conduct
against the opposing side's attorney in negligence; arguing that the same stan-
dard of care used in typical legal malpractice lawsuits should be used in the
new proposal); see also VAIRO, supra note 16, § 5.03 (discussing application
of the objective standard for Civil Rule 11 motions).
26. See VAIRO, supra note 16, §§ 5.02-.03 (discussing the adoption and ap-
plication of the objective standard).
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code of conduct from scratch rather than by application of the princi-
ples underlying Model Rule 3.1. This is so, because:
Under an objective approach, the court being asked to im-
pose sanctions assesses frivolousness as a matter of law by
examining the merits of the positions in light of governing
legal authority.
In contrast, the older, subjective standard focuses on the
lawyer's own intent and the presence or absence of good
faith. Under a subjective standard, sanctions are not im-
posed as long as the lawyer in good faith believed the claim
had merit.
27
Thus, unlike legal malpractice cases, 28 where evidence on the
standard of care is required to be introduced by expert testimony,29
and the finder of fact is then left to apply the facts to the law and to
reach a judgment,3 ° the 1983 and 1993 Civil Rule 11 case law gave
rise to a "standard of care" as a matter of law-not fact, which is
nothing less than the creation of a separate code of conduct.
31
27. LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 61:104 (ABA/BNA) (1999) (cita-
tions omitted; emphasis added) (discussing meritorious claims and standards
for frivolousness).
28. For a comprehensive treatment of the law of legal malpractice, see
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (5th ed.
2000 & Supp. 2003). For a survey of this topic, see DAVID J. MEISELMAN,
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE (1980 & Supp. 2003). For
a concise treatment of this area, see JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ch. 7 (2000); and LAWS. MAN. ON PROF.
CONDUCT 301:101-:917 (ABA/BNA) (1998-99). See also SECTION OF
LITIG., A.B.A., BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION ch. 6 (George F. McGunnigle, Jr.
ed., 1992) (discussing in tandem liability for accountants and lawyers).
For those interested in avoiding legal malpractice claims, see DUKE
NORDLINGER STERN & Jo ANN FELIX-RETZKE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1983 & Supp. 2003). See also LAWS.
MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 301:1001-:1019 (ABA/BNA) (2000); STANDING
COMM. ON LAW. PROF'L LIAB., A.B.A., LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO
PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE (Lynne S. Bassis ed., 2d ed. 1999).
29. See, e.g., 5 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 28, §§ 33.15-.19 (explaining
use of expert witnesses in legal malpractice cases).
30. Id. § 33.24 (discussing proving the underlying action via a trial by judge
or jury).
31. E.g., Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Be-
cause of our reluctance to constrain the discretion of attorneys in the vigorous
advocacy of their clients' interests, we penalize them only where they have
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In result, the case law that has developed since 1983 has rein-
vented the wheel,32 when the courts could have just as easily looked
to the already existing ABA Model Rules or Model Code then gov-
erning attorneys. 33 As catalogued by Professor Georgene M. Vairo
in her exhaustive treatise on Civil Rule 11, this reinvention has cre-
ated much confusion in the case law,34 arguably because the courts
have articulated a factual test to which they have paid only lip-
service, 5 while all the time applying a legal test, which they have
created without acknowledgment.
36
Imagine what would happen if for the last twenty years, the fed-
eral courts had said that Civil Rule 11 would be governed by the rea-
sonably competent attorney standard, imagine what would happen if
no evidence was ever taken as to what that standard was, and imag-
ine what would happen if the courts had made up ad hoc their own
proxies for Model Rule 3.1 via Civil Rule 11. Now open your eyes
to the jurisprudence of Civil Rule 11. If the courts were going to de-
cide these cases as matters of law, why did they choose to ignore the
failed to maintain a minimum standard of professional responsibility."), cert.
denied sub nom. Hyde v. Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
32. See infra Part VII.
33. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., VAIRO, supra note 16, § 2.03 (discussing the attempts to in-
terpret the 1983 amendments to Civil Rule 11).
35. For instance, there are no Civil Rule 11 cases that even discuss the ad-
missibility of expert testimony in such proceedings. Author's statistic deter-
mined by a LEXIS search conducted on Sep. 15, 2003 in the combined federal
court cases library: [rule 11/s expert Is admiss!]. No date restriction was used
for this search.
36. For instance, there are no Civil Rule cases that even define the standard
of proof or weight of evidence needed to support a sanctions finding. Author's
statistic determined by LEXIS searches conducted on Sep. 15, 2003 in the
combined federal court cases library: [rule 11 /s "standard of proof' but not
criminal]; [rule 11 /s "standard of evidence" but not criminal]; [rule 11 /s
"clear and convincing" but not criminal]; [rule I 1/s "weight of evidence" but
not criminal]; and [rule 11/s "weight of the evidence" but not criminal]. No
date restrictions were used for these searches.
This statistic is supported by the general sanctions literature. See
GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LmGATIoN ABUSE
§ 17(A)(5) (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2003) (noting that while the standard of proof
or weight of evidence issue has not been directly addressed by the courts, some
courts seem to have applied a preponderance of evidence standard, while oth-
ers seem to have applied a clear-and-convincing evidence standard).
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mandatory legal standards imposed upon all lawyers by Model Rule
3.1 or its predecessor Disciplinary Rule 7-102? This is the central
inquiry of this Article.
After presenting the primary litigation ethics rules (Model Rules
3.1-3.4) and Civil Rule 11 in Parts II and 111, 37 this Article examines
the impact these litigation ethics rules have had on the Civil Rule 11
case law in Part IV.38 Then, in Part V,3 9 it discusses the criticism of
using Civil Rule 11 to enforce these litigation ethics rules; and in
Parts VI and VII,40 this Article attempts to explain why these litiga-
tion ethics rules have generally been separated from Civil Rule 11
analysis as well as the consequences that have flowed there from.
Finally in Parts VIII-X,41 this Article explains why the litigation eth-
ics rules should be the Civil Rule 11 standard for attorneys; it pro-
poses a revision to Civil Rule 11 that integrates it with legal ethics
and professional responsibility law; and it concludes that it is the ob-
ligation of the courts to enforce the litigation ethics rules, among
others, through Civil Rule 11.
II. PRIMARY LITIGATION ETmcs RULES
So what are these relevant litigation ethics rules?
The current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain
numerous provisions that relate to legal ethics and professional re-
sponsibility in the litigation context, although the primary one is
Model Rule 3.1:42
37. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 55-125 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 126-147 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 148-200 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 201-225 and accompanying text.
42. There are many other Model Rules that relate to civil litigation, such as
3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum to the Tribunal), 3.6 (Trial Publicity), 3.7
(Lawyer as Witness), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 4.2 (Commu-
nication with Person Represented by Counsel), 4.4 (Respect for Rights of
Third Persons), 5.1 (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory
Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of Subordinate Lawyer), 5.3 (Responsibilities
Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-
jurisdictional Practice of Law), and 5.6 (Restrictions on Right to Practice). In
addition, many of the rules regarding the client-lawyer relationship, Model
Rules 1.1 through 1.18, can impact civil litigation in many ways, such as in
disqualification motions, fee applications, etc.
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Rule 3.1 is one of many prohibitions against frivolous or
baseless conduct in the course of litigation. Rule 3.4(d)
bars frivolous pretrial discovery requests, and Rule 3.2 re-
quires reasonable efforts to expedite litigation. A federal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, penalizes lawyers who "unrea-
sonably and vexatiously" multiply litigation; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1912 and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure address frivolous appeals.
Rule 3.1 parallels and is best analyzed in tandem with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.43
Model Rule 3.1, in addition to Model Rules 3.2 through 3.4, are
set forth below (the "litigation ethics rules"), as these all impact Civil
Rule 11.44
43. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 12, § 3.1, at 320-21 (citations
omitted).
"For a full analysis of [Civil] Rule 11 and the interplay between [it and
Model] Rule 3.1," id. at 321, compare LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
61:101-:125 (ABA/BNA) (1999) (discussing meritorious claims), with id.
at 61:151-:189 (1994) (discussing Civil Rule 11). For a discussion of the
relationship between Civil Rule 11 and Model Rules 3.2 & 3.4, see id. at
61:201-:203 (1996) (discussing expediting litigation). For a partial discus-
sion of Model Rule 3.3, see id. at 61:301-:308 (1997) (discussing candor
toward tribunals). For a survey of all of the remedies for frivolous conduct,
see id. at 61:101-: 125 (1999) (discussing professional discipline, Civil Rule
11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 28 U.S.C. § 1912 & Appellate Rule 38, Supreme Court
Rule 49.2, inherent power, and tort liability). See generally JOSEPH, supra note
36, passim (detailed discussion of just these civil sanctions rules and statutes
expanded to include sanctions under pre-trial, discovery, and local court rules,
but not discussing professional discipline, the Supreme Court Rule, or tort li-
ability).
44. See generally 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYER1NG ch. 26 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003) (overall discussion of
Part 3 of the Model Rules, which focus on the lawyer as advocate, their rela-
tionship with other parts of the Model Rules, and their relationship with the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers).
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A. Meritorious Claims and Contentions (Model Rule 3. 1)
4 5
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a
criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend
the proceeding as to require that every element of the case
be established.46
45. For a general discussion of the law in this area, see RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY ch. 22 (2002) (discussing Model Rule 3.1 & Civil Rule 11).
See also ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 12, § 3.1 (noting the 2002
change deleting client's motivation as a factor, among others, because it is ir-
relevant to an objective analysis; discussing relevant disciplinary cases under
the rule); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 44, at ch. 27 (detailed discussion of
Model Rule 3.1 and Civil Rule 11 in comparison to the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers section 110(1 & 2)); LAWS. MAN. ON PROF.
CONDUCT 61:101-:125 (ABA/BNA) (1999) (discussing meritorious
claims).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003).
The comments to this rule are as follows:
[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest
benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal proce-
dure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits
within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not al-
ways clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper
scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and
potential for change.
[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a
client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence
only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they
inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the appli-
cable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in
support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even
though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not
prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable ei-
ther to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or
to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.
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B. Expediting Litigation (Model Rule 3.2)
47
"A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.
' 4S
[3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to fed-
eral or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal
matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention
that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.
Id. cmts. 1-3.
The comparison to the Model Code is as follows:
DR 7-102(A)(1) provided that a lawyer may not "[flile a suit, assert
a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on be-
half of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." Rule 3.1
is to the same general effect as DR 7-102(A)(1), with three qualifica-
tions. First, the test of improper conduct is changed from "merely to
harass or maliciously injure another" to the requirement that there be a
basis for the litigation measure involved that is "not frivolous." This
includes the concept stated in DR 7-102(A)(2) that a lawyer may ad-
vance a claim or defense unwarranted by existing law if "it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law." Second, the test in Rule 3.1 is an objective
test, whereas DR 7-102(A)(1) applied only if the lawyer "knows or
when it is obvious" that the litigation is frivolous. Third, Rule 3.1 has
an exception that in a criminal case, or a case in which incarceration of
the client may result (for example, certain juvenile proceedings), the
lawyer may put the prosecution to its proof even if there is no non-
frivolous basis for defense.
MODEL RULES HIsTORY, supra note 4, at 163-64.
47. For a general discussion of the law in this area, see ROTUNDA, supra
note 45, § 23-1 (discussing Model Rule 3.2). See also ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES, supra note 12, § 3.2 (noting the 2002 change expanding the scope of
when an attorney may engage in delay; discussing relevant disciplinary cases
under the rule); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 44, at ch. 28 (detailed discus-
sion of Model Rule 3.2 and Civil Rule 11 in comparison to the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers section 106 cmt. e); LAWS. MAN. ON
PROF. CONDUCT 61:201-:203 (ABA/BNA) (1996) (discussing expediting
litigation).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2003).
The comment to this rule is as follows:
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly
seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer
to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the
advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful
836 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:819
C. Candor Toward the Tribunal (Model Rule 3.3)49
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribu-
nal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be di-
rectly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed
by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the
lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes
to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable re-
medial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than
redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often
tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent
lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as hav-
ing some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a le-
gitimate interest of the client.
Id. cmt. 1.
The comparison to the Model Code is as follows:
DR 7-101(A)(1) stated that a lawyer does not violate the duty to
represent a client zealously "by being punctual in fulfilling all profes-
sional commitments." DR 7-102(A)(1) provided that a lawyer "shall
not... file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense [or] delay a
trial... when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
MODEL RULES HISTORY, supra note 4, at 165.
49. For a general discussion of the law in this area, see ROTUNDA, supra
note 45, at ch. 24 (discussing Model Rule 3.3). See also ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES, supra note 12, § 3.3 (noting the 2002 change no longer requiring that
the misrepresentation be material and requiring the lawyer to correct mistakes
and take remedial measures, among others; discussing lawyer's role as an offi-
cer of the court and the corresponding duty of candor; discussing relevant dis-
ciplinary cases under the rule); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 44, at ch. 29
(detailed discussion of Model Rule 3.3 and Civil Rule 11 in comparison to the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers sections 105, 111 & 120);
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 61:301-:125 (ABA/BNA) (1997) (dis-
cussing candor toward tribunals).
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the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative
proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage,
is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent con-
duct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable reme-
dial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tri-
bunal.
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to
the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compli-
ance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tri-
bunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will en-
able the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or
not the facts are adverse. °
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003).
The comments to this rule are as follows:
[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a
client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(m) for the defini-
tion of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is representing a
client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's
adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, para-
graph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if
the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposi-
tion has offered evidence that is false.
[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of
the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudi-
cative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive
force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the
client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the
tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding
is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to
vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not al-
low the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evi-
dence that the lawyer knows to be false.
Representations by a Lawyer
[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents
prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal
knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordi-
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narily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's
behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. How-
ever, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as
in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may
properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or
believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry.
There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation pre-
scribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the
client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compli-
ance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the
Comment to Rule 8.4(b).
Legal Argument
[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of
law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not re-
quired to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recog-
nize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated
in paragraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse
authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by
the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a
discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable
to the case.
Offering Evidence
[5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evi-
dence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's
wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer
of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evi-
dence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the
evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.
[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or
wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek
to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the
persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the cli-
ent, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a por-
tion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the
witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to
present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.
[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers,
including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions,
however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a wit-
ness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if
counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obli-
gation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is sub-
ordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9].
[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if
the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable be-
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lief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier
of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be
inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, although a
lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other
evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious
falsehood.
[9] Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering
evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse
to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is
false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's abil-
ity to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the law-
yer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections
historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not
permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where
the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony
will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the
lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment
[7].
Remedial Measures
[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true,
a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false.
Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another
witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be
false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to
cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the
lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during
a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In
such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the
client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to
the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the with-
drawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails,
the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the
representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false
evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is
reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires
the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by
Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be
done-making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, order-
ing a mistrial or perhaps nothing.
[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave
consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but
also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the al-
ternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby
subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is de-
signed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is
clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose
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the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the law-
yer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep
silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a
party to fraud on the court.
Preserving Integrity ofAdjudicative Process
[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against
criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the ad-
judicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlaw-
fully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other par-
ticipant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing
documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the
tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a
lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if
necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the
lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.
Duration of Obligation
[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evi-
dence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The
conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the ter-
mination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the
meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has
been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed.
Ex Parte Proceedings
[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of pre-
senting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reach-
ing a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by
the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an
application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of
presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte pro-
ceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge
has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just con-
sideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative
duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and
that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed deci-
sion.
Withdrawal
[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor im-
posed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the
representation of a client whose interests will be or have been ad-
versely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, how-
ever, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to
withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor
results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relation-
ship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client.
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Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be
permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection
with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a cli-
ent's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the rep-
resentation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this
Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
Id. cmts. 1-15.
The comparison to the Model Code is as follows:
Paragraph (a)(1) is substantially identical to DR 7-102(A)(5),
which provided that a lawyer shall not "knowingly make a false
statement of law or fact."
Paragraph (a)(2) is implicit in DR 7-102(A)(3), which provided that
"a lawyer shall not... knowingly fail to disclose that which he is re-
quired by law to reveal."
Paragraph (a)(3) is substantially identical to DR 7-106(B)(1).
With regard to paragraph (a)(4), the first sentence of this subpara-
graph is similar to DR 7-102(A)(4), which provided that a lawyer shall
not "knowingly use" perjured testimony or false evidence. The sec-
ond sentence of paragraph (a)(4) resolves an ambiguity in the Model
Code concerning the action required of a lawyer who discovers that
the lawyer has offered perjured testimony or false evidence. DR 7-
102(A)(4), quoted above, did not expressly deal with this situation, but
the prohibition against "use" of false evidence can be construed to
preclude carrying through with a case based on such evidence when
that fact has become known during the trial. DR 7-102(B)(1), also
noted in connection with Rule 1.6, provided that a lawyer "who re-
ceives information clearly establishing that... [h]is client has... per-
petrated a fraud upon.., a tribunal shall [if the client does not rectify
the situation]... reveal the fraud to the... tribunal.... ." Since use
of perjured testimony or false evidence is usually regarded as "fraud"
upon the court, DR 7-102(B)(1) apparently required disclosure by the
lawyer in such circumstances. However, some states have amended
DR 7-102(B)(1) in conformity with an ABA-recommended amend-
ment to provide that the duty of disclosure does not apply when the
"information is protected as a privileged communication." This quali-
fication may be empty, for the rule of attorney-client privilege has
been construed to exclude communications that further a crime, in-
cluding the crime of perjury. On this interpretation of DR 7-
102(B)(1), the lawyer had a duty to disclose the perjury.
Paragraph (c) confers discretion on the lawyer to refuse to offer
evidence that the lawyer "reasonably believes" is false. This gives the
lawyer more latitude than DR 7-102(A)(4), which prohibited the law-
yer from offering evidence the lawyer "knows" is false.
There was no counterpart in the Model Code to paragraph (d).
MODEL RULES HISTORY, supra note 4, at 170-71.
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D. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel (Model Rule 3.4)5
1
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence
or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other
material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohib-
ited by law;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tri-
bunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that
no valid obligation exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request
or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply With a
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported
by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts
in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a per-
sonal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of
a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or in-
nocence of an accused; or
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from vol-
untarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other
agent of a client; and
51. For a general discussion of the law in this area, see ROTUNDA, supra
note 45, at ch. 24 (discussing Model Rule 3.4). See also ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES, supra note 12, § 3.4 (discussing relevant disciplinary cases under the
rule); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 44, at ch. 30 (detailed discussion of
Model Rule 3.4 and Civil Rule 11 in comparison to the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers sections 105-107, 110 & 116-117); LAWS. MAN.
ON PROF. CONDUCT 61:701-:729 (ABA/BNA) (1997) (discussing fairness
to opposing party).
For a detailed discussion of the law regarding spoliation of evidence,
see MARGARET M. KOESEL, DAVID A. BELL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL,
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION (Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2000).
Winter 2004] INTEGRATING LE&PR WITH RULE 1
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's in-
terests will not be adversely affected by refraining from
giving such information. 2
52. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2003).
The comments to this rule are as follows:
[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the
evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending
parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohi-
bitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly in-
fluencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and
the like.
[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to es-
tablish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right
of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence
through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The
exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered,
concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it
an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability
in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be fore-
seen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Para-
graph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including comput-
erized information. Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take
temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the
purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or de-
stroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applica-
ble law may require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police
or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.
[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a wit-
ness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permit-
ted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is im-
proper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is
improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.
[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client
to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees
may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2.
Id. cmts. 1-4.
The comparison to the Model Code is as follows:
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 7-109(A) provided that a lawyer
"shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obli-
gation to reveal." DR 7-109(B) provided that a lawyer "shall not ad-
vise or cause a person to secrete himself... for the purpose of making
him unavailable as a witness .... ." DR 7-106(C)(7) provided that a
lawyer shall not "[i]ntentionally or habitually violate any established
rule of procedure or of evidence."
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III. CIVIL RULE 11
The above-referenced litigation ethics rules, among others, are
implicitly enforced by, or de facto impact the enforcement of, Civil
Rule 11, in addition to being used within the disciplinary context.
Both the 1983 and 1993 versions of Civil Rule 11 appear below.
A. 1983 Version
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attor-
ney of record in his individual name, whose address shall
be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-102(A)(6) provided that a law-
yer shall not participate "in the creation or preservation of evidence
when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false." DR 7-
109(c) [sic] provided that a lawyer "shall not pay, offer to pay, or ac-
quiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon
the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer
may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the payment of: (1) Expenses
reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying; (2) Rea-
sonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or
testifying; (or) (3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an
expert witness." EC 7-28 stated that witnesses "should always testify
truthfully and should be free from any financial inducements that
might tempt them to do otherwise."
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR 7-106(A), which pro-
vided that "A lawyer shall not disregard.., a standing rule of a tribu-
nal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he
may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such
rule or ruling."
Paragraph (d) has no counterpart in the Model Code.
Paragraph (e) substantially incorporates DR 7-106(C)(1), (2), (3)
and (4). DR 7-106(C)(2) proscribed asking a question "intended to
degrade a witness or other person," a matter dealt with in Rule 4.4.
DR 7-106(C)(5), providing that a lawyer shall not "fail to comply with
known local customs of courtesy or practice," was too vague to be a
rule of conduct enforceable as law.
With regard to paragraph (f), DR 7-104(A)(2) provided that a law-
yer shall not "give advice to a person who is not represented... other
than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or
have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of
his client."
MODEL RULES HISTORY, supra note 4, at 178.
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shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by
rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of
two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by exist-
ing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or
movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
53
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (Signing of Pleading, Motions, and Other Pa-
pers; Sanctions). See also id. at advisory committee's note (explaining the his-
tory and reasons for its revision).
The 1983 version of Rule 11 was technically amended in 1987, but
those amendments were nonsubstantive. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1987) (Signing of
Pleading, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions); see also id. at advisory
committee's note (stating same).
The original 1937 version of Rule 11 provided as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be veri-
fied or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the aver-
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B. 1993 Version
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other
paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not repre-
sented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each
paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number,
if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omis-
sion of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating)
a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the per-
son's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivo-
lous argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are
ments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of
two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circum-
stances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certifi-
cate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or
is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the
pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an at-
torney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (1937) (Signing of Pleadings); see also id. at advisory
committee's note (explaining the history and reasons for its enaction).
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likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are rea-
sonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity
to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has
been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the at-
torneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision
(b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule
shall be made separately from other motions or requests
and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5,
but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless,
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the
court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in pre-
senting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional cir-
cumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible
for violations committed by its partners, associates, and
employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the
court may enter an order describing the specific conduct
that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an at-
torney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not
violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction im-
posed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what
is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or com-
parable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to
the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanc-
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tion may consist of, or include, directives of a non-
monetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court,
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of
some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the
court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show
cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose at-
torneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall
describe the conduct determined to constitute a viola-
tion of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through
(c) of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery re-
quests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject
to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.54
IV. IMPACT OF LITIGATIoN ETHIcS RULES ON CIVIL RULE 11 CASE
LAW
Given the fact that state litigation ethics rules-whether based
upon the Model Code or the Model Rules-are mandatory for every
lawyer practicing within that state, and given the fact that they are
usually adopted by the federal courts within those jurisdictions, 55 one
might expect that a civil rule allowing private enforcement of these
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993) (Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other
Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions); see also id. at advisory commit-
tee's note (explaining the history and reasons for its revision).
55. See MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, § 802.01 (discussing
as of June 2001 how most federal courts govern attorney conduct by local rules
that either adopt the rules of the state jurisdiction as modified (87%), the ABA
rules verbatim (6%), or some sort of unique conduct rules--or no conduct rules
altogether (remainder)). "For a chart of the various district court's treatment of
attorney conduct, see § 802.06." Id.
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rules by opposing parties in federal litigation would have engendered
a lot of discussion within the sanctions case law. However, there has
been almost no discussion of these litigation ethics rules in Civil
Rule 11 decisions; specifically, from 1983 to date, only nine circuit
court of appeals opinions have discussed the applicable litigation eth-
ics rules in this context, 56 even though Civil Rule 11 gave rise to over
6,000 decisions within the first decade (1983 version),57 and over
2,000 decisions within the second decade (1993 version).5 The
same search turned-up only seventeen such district court opinions.
5 9
Even where the case law discussed the applicable litigation eth-
ics rules, the discussion was generally superficial.60 Not a single cir-
cuit court explicitly adopted these litigation ethics rules as the stan-
dard for Civil Rule 11,61 and one circuit court actually rejected them
as the standard over a rehearing en banc denial dissent by four judges
of the Ninth Circuit.62 One circuit court and a smattering of district
courts seem to have implicitly adopted them as the standard; 63 but
56. Author's statistic determined by a LEXIS search conducted on Sep. 22,
2003 in the combined federal court cases library: [sanctions /p (11/s 3.1 or 3.2
or 3.3 or 3.4) and date(>1/1/1983)]. False positives were excluded; additional
research was conducted. No research design is perfect, and additional cases
would surely be found if the search was coordinated with the other sanctions
rules and statutes besides Civil Rule 11.
57. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 2.02[b][1][A] (discussing the Rule 11 cot-
tage industry).
58. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer
Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the
Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2004) (discussing empirical
research conducted by Professor Joy on the incidence of Civil Rule 11 cases).
59. Author's statistic determined by a LEXIS search conducted on Sep. 22,
2003 in the combined federal court cases library: [sanctions /p (11/s 3.1 or 3.2
or 3.3 or 3.4) and date(>l/l/1983)]. False positives were excluded; additional
research was conducted. False positives were excluded; additional research
was conducted. No research design is perfect, and additional cases would
surely be found if the search was coordinated with the other sanctions rules and
statutes besides Civil Rule 11.
60. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
61. See id.
Note that one circuit court seems to have implicitly adopted the litiga-
tion ethic rules as the standard. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying
text.
62. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 97-123 and accompanying text.
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given the enormous number of Rule 11 cases, when so few courts
have even addressed the issue, it is hard to describe this as creating a
standard for the federal courts. This finding is consistent with the
limited use of the Model Rules, in general, by the federal courts.
64
Since so few cases have discussed the litigation ethics rules in
this context, it may be useful to review what these courts have said
about this interaction, and more specifically how they said it, with
the hope that this review might shed some light on the apparent dis-
connect between these rules.
A. Litigation Ethics Rules Discussed Superficially
Several federal court opinions have discussed the relevant litiga-
tion ethics rules within the context of Civil Rule 11, but they have
done so only superficially and without analysis as to whether these
rules give rise to a sanctions standard.
For instance, in Lepucki v. Van Wormer,65 in upholding Rule 11
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against the plaintiff's counsel, and in
issuing Appellate Rule 38 sanctions against him in addition to refer-
ring him to the state disciplinary authorities, the Seventh Circuit ob-
served that:
Our system of jurisprudence is designed to insure [sic]
that all disputants with colorable claims have access to the
courthouse. Relatively low barriers to entry have, however,
generated an undesirable result-a deluge of frivolous or
vexatious claims filed by the uninformed, the misinformed,
and the unscrupulous. These claims clog court dockets and
threaten to undermine the ability of the judiciary to effi-
ciently administer the press of cases properly before it.
Perhaps the greatest safeguard against this danger is the in-
tegrity and good sense of practicing lawyers who, as offi-
cers of the court, have both an ethical and a legal duty to
screen the claims of their clients for factual veracity and le-
gal sufficiency. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1
64. See MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 19, § 802.20[l] (describ-
ing research studies showing that Model Rules are infrequently used in federal
court, and some rules are not used at all).
65. 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Hyde v. Van
Wormer, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
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(1983); Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Lawyers have a unique opportu-
nity to counsel restraint or recklessness, to craft imaginative
arguments or to press empty challenges to well-settled prin-
ciples. Because of our reluctance to constrain the discretion
of attorneys in the vigorous advocacy of their clients' inter-
ests, we penalize them only where they have failed to main-
tain a minimum standard of professional responsibility. But
we will not overlook such a failure when it occurs, in part
because it evidences disdain for the public, whose claims lie
dormant because frivolous suits have diverted away scarce
judicial resources, disdain for adversaries, who must ex-
pend time and money to defend against meritless attacks,
and disdain for clients, whose trust is rewarded with legal
bills, dismissals, and court-imposed sanctions.
66
However, the Lepucki court did not analyze the sanctions issue
in terms of Model Rule 3.1, nor did it articulate a standard for future
litigants.67 Essentially, the court used Model Rule 3.1 and Civil Rule
66. Id. at 87.
67. Likewise, in Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 690 F.
Supp. 728 (N.D. Ill. 1988), the court sua sponte sanctioned the plaintiffs' law-
yers under Civil Rule 11, and it noted that:
Rule 11 is not a toy. A lawyer who transgresses the rule abuses the
special role our legal system has entrusted to him. He can suffer se-
vere financial sanctions and, if his misconduct persists, he can find
himself before a disciplinary commission. In short, a Rule 11 viola-
tion is a serious thing, and an accusation of such wrongdoing is
equally serious.
Id. at 732 (citations omitted, but citing Model Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.")).
In a similar vein, in McKenzie v. Crotty, 738 F. Supp. 1287 (D.S.D.
1990), the court advised the defendants' counsel that it was considering impos-
ing sanctions against him, id. at 1290, and it stated that:
Although [the] plaintiff has not moved for sanctions, the Court has
inherent power to impose sanctions for abusive litigation practices.
This power is recognized in Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, which states that "the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose" sanctions
against a party or his attorney for interposing a motion which is not
well grounded in existing law or is interposed for an improper pur-
pose. Cf South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct DR 3.1. The
Court may also sanction defendants' attorney, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
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for unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings in the
case.
Id. at 1289 (citations omitted).
Following Draper & Kramer, in Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk, No. 86-
C-2853, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11168 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1991), rev'd & re-
manded on other grounds, 991 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
932 (1993), the magistrate judge recommended the imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
tions against the plaintiff's counsel, and it cited Model Rule 3.3 without dis-
cussion, as follows:
We conclude that [the defendant's] counsel did not violate Rule 11
in filing this motion [to dismiss]. We further conclude that in de-
manding sanctions without a reasonable basis [the plaintiff's] counsel
did. Rule 11 permits sanctions against a party who files a groundless
request for sanctions. A Rule 11 claim, like anything else a lawyer
puts into papers filed with the court, must be based on a reasonable re-
view of the law and the facts. It is the law that a court can find a
copyright invalid on legal grounds, notwithstanding its acceptance for
registration. It is also the law that an advocate may disagree with the
opinion of another district judge as to the meaning of a Court of Ap-
peals decision.
A Rule 11 claim is a potent weapon, but he who shoots from the
hip may shoot himself in the foot. As Judge Duff said in Draper &
Kramer, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc.:
This court appreciates that attorneys involved in heated litiga-
tion often employ rhetoric stronger than necessary, and the court
can tolerate arguments harsher in tone than appropriate. This tol-
erance ends, however, when arguments turn into accusations of
professional misconduct.
Rule 11 is not a toy. A lawyer who transgresses the rule abuses
the special role our legal system has entrusted to him. He can suf-
fer severe financial sanctions and, if his misconduct persists, he
can find himself before a disciplinary commission. See, e.g.,
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.1 ("A lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.").
In short, a Rule 11 violation is a serious thing, and an accusation
of such wrongdoing is equally serious.
The court accordingly recommends a finding that [the plaintiffs]
counsel.., violated Rule 11 in asking for sanctions without proper
grounds. Since [the defendant's] counsel's response consisted of one
footnote, an award of attorney's fees of $150 would be appropriate.
We hope this modest penalty will encourage counsel to think carefully
before accusing opponents of improper conduct and adding a spurious
sanctions issue to a legitimate dispute.
Id. at *31-*33 (citations omitted, but citing Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. Baskin-
Robbins, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 728, 732 (N.D. 11. 1988)).
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11 merely to lecture the attorneys as to their obligations as officers of
the court.
In Harris v. Heinrich,68 the Eleventh Circuit reversed Rule 11
sanctions that had been awarded against the plaintiff, and it re-
manded the case for specific findings to support the same; but it
noted in passing that:
The fact that an attorney was willing to take the appeal also
supports [the plaintiffs] argument that it is inappropriate to
impose Rule 11 sanctions on him. Cf ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.1 (a lawyer shall not bring claims
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous). On
remand the district court should address this inconsis-
tency.69
Thus, the Harris court reasoned that the attorney's assumed
compliance with Model Rule 3.1 should have been a factor in analyz-
ing whether Civil Rule 11 sanctions should have been imposed.70
In DiSante v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc.,71 the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a minimal Rule 11 sanction award against the
The disposition of the magistrate's report and recommendation by the
district court was not reported or otherwise available on-line.
68. 919F.2d 1515 (llthCir. 1990).
69. Id. at 1517.
70. In a similar vein, in Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, Inc.,
951 F. Supp. 1028 (D.P.R. 1996), aff'd, 124 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 1997), in grant-
ing the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court noted in passing
that:
The plaintiffs' claims... were not merely novel, but came peril-
ously close to the frivolous, given that no colorable argument could be
made .... Although the claims did not cross the line into frivolous-
ness, the plaintiffs should be aware that the filing of an opposition
based on frivolous arguments may result in judicial sanctions under
Rule 11. See Fed.R.Civ.P. I I(b)(2). Furthermore, although attorneys
have an ethical duty to vigorously advocate their clients' interests, so,
too, do they have an ethical duty not to assert frivolous positions. See
Rule 3.1, Local Rules of Professional Responsibility (Local Rules of
the Court App. II) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
Id. at 1035 n.5.
71. 928 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision), opinion
available at 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4711.
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plaintiff, but it rejected the trial court's finding and conclusion that
the defendant had violated various litigation ethics rules. The court,
without commenting as to whether the litigation ethics rules should
have been taken into account, explained that:
The district court found in an oral opinion that the factual
allegations of the complaint were not well grounded in fact
and that no reasonable prefiling inquiry had been made. ....
At a later hearing the district court reaffirmed this ruling,
noting, however, the difficulty in conducting a prefiling in-
quiry when a prospective defendant possesses most of the
relevant information. It imposed sanctions in the amount of
$250.00, rather than the much larger amount of attorney
fees [the] defendant actually incurred between the filing of
the complaint and its dismissal.
In selecting what it termed a "minimal" sanction, the dis-
trict court reasoned as follows::
[The] [d]efendant... was uncooperative from the
start other than making a nominal offer of judgment,
which led to a great deal of delay in the resolution of
this matter. [The] [p]laintiff has had to file motions of
various kinds including a motion to compel. ... [The]
[p]laintiff could have deposed various people within
the corporation... but chose to wait... for the docu-
ments requested to better structure the depositions ...
When the [d]efendants finally complied after stone-
walling for weeks and months, [the] [p]laintiffs with-
drew their opposition to [the] [d]efendant's motion for
summary judgment. . . . If the [d]efendants had been
more cooperative from the start, the [p]laintiffs would
have dismissed the suit earlier and the court would not
presently be dealing with a Rule 11 motion.
The district court then stated its view that there was a se-
rious question whether defense counsel complied with Rule
3.2 or 3.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 3.2 requires a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ex-
pedite litigation, consistent with the interests of his client.
The district court opined that [the] defendant's "stonewall-
ing" was not a reasonable effort to expedite litigation. Rule
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3.4 mandates that a lawyer make a reasonably diligent ef-
fort to comply with a legally proper discovery request. The
district court said that [the] defendant's activity in discov-
ery was "questionable."
The district court concluded its remarks by saying that
[the] defendant "could have avoided this whole thing by be-
ing forthright, coming up with the evidence that showed
they had no case, presenting it to the [p]laintiff." In the
court's opinion, [the] "[d]efendant was obstructive and un-
cooperative throughout discovery and hence practically all
of the attorney fees accumulated by [the] [d]efendant could
be attributed in part to [the] [d]efendant's own lack of co-
operation."
The trial court also properly considered Rule I I's goal of
compensating opponents of Rule I I violators. In connec-
tion with this issue, it correctly found the fact that much of
[the] defendants' attorneys fees were attributable to its own
strategy choices in responding to the litigation. The attor-
neys fees sought by [the] defendants exceeded $200,000.00.
Given the procedural posture of this case and the very lim-
ited discovery conducted, obvious questions exist concern-
ing the reasonableness of the requested fee. The district
court could have elected to award the amount of reasonable
attorneys fees as a sanction, but it was not required to do so.
Moreover, "[a] reasonableness inquiry necessarily requires
a determination as to what extent [the defendant's] ex-
penses and fees could have been avoided and were self-
imposed." The trial court made a determination here that
virtually all [the] defendant's fees could have been avoided.
It could have decided that no monetary sanction at all was
warranted, and its award of a minimal sanction cannot be
considered an abuse of discretion.
This court disagrees, however, with the implication in the
district court's ruling that defense counsel violated ethical
rules in this litigation-an implication unsupported by the
record. To be sure, [the] defendant chose to resist vigor-
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ously [the] plaintiffs' request for document production. Its
choice perhaps resulted in the district court's choice of a
minimal $250.00 sanction. Yet there is nothing to suggest
that [the] defendant's strategy decision was without any le-
gal or factual basis, particularly in view of the rulings of the
magistrate and district court on [the] plaintiffs' motion to
compel.
The magistrate ruled that defendant was required to pro-
duce the documents, but said its position had "reasonable
justification." The district court modified the magistrate's
ruling in [the] defendant's favor, thus concluding that, to
some extent, its objections had merit. Under these circum-
stances, the court cannot say that defendant acted inappro-
priately or unethically. Rather, [the] defendant simply
made strategy decisions for which the district court could
conclude, in its discretion, that [the] defendant should bear
the cost.
72
72. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4711, at *7-*13 (citations omitted).
Likewise, in Saturn Systems, Inc. v. Saturn Corp., 659 F. Supp. 868
(N.D. Minn. 1987), in sanctioning the plaintiff's counsel, the court noted that
"[t]he source of these errors may lie in plaintiff's counsel's failure to cite or
discuss the Supreme Court's decision in [the controlling case] despite the fact
that that decision sets forth the principles which determine proper venue in a
Lanham Act case." Id. at 870 (footnote omitted). However, the court noted
that:
Counsel's conduct in this regard did not offend the applicable stan-
dards of professional conduct, and this court does not base its decision
to impose sanctions on a violation of these standards. The Code of
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, which
D.Minn.R. I(C) obligates counsel to observe, requires disclosure of
adverse authority only if the authority in question is not disclosed by
opposing counsel. A.B.A. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 7-106(B)(1).
Counsel's obligation to disclose adverse authority under the Minne-
sota Rules of Professional Conduct is subject to the same qualifica-
tion. Minn.R.Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3). Defendant's initial memoran-
dum in support of its motion to dismiss or transfer cited and discussed
both... decisions, thus relieving plaintiff's counsel of his obligation
under these rules to disclose them. Defendant's disclosure of these
decisions, however, did not relieve plaintiff's counsel of his obligation
to undertake the reasonable prefiling inquiry required by Rule 11, an
obligation counsel had already violated.
Id. at 870 n.2.
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Thus, while the DiSante court found that one court's frivolous
conduct is another's legitimate trial strategy, and while it disagreed
with the trial court as to whether the defense counsel had acted un-
ethically, it upheld the trial court's underlying reasoning as to why
the sanctions awarded should be so low compared to the amount re-
quested.
In Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix),73 the Seventh Circuit or-
dered the appellant's insurance carrier's counsel to show cause why
he should not be sanctioned under Appellate Rules 38 and 46(c) for
failing to cite controlling adverse authority, and it discussed Civil
Rule 11 as follows:
Although... the circuits are divided (and we have not
taken sides) on whether a failure to acknowledge binding
adverse precedent violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, if [the appel-
lant's] counsel knowingly concealed dispositive adverse au-
thority it engaged in professional misconduct. ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983) [sic].
The inference would arise that it had filed the appeal for
purposes of delay, which would be an abuse of process and
thus provide an additional basis for imposition of sanctions
under Fed. R. App. P. 38 ("damages for delay"). A frivo-
lous suit or appeal corresponds, at least approximately, to
the tort of malicious prosecution, that is, groundless litiga-
tion; a suit or appeal that is not necessarily groundless but
was filed for an improper purpose, such as delay, corre-
sponds to-indeed is an instance of-abuse of process.
Both, we hold, are sanctionable under Rule 38. ....
... Rule 46(c) of the appellate rules authorizes us to dis-
cipline lawyers who practice before us. In deciding
whether a lawyer has engaged in conduct sanctionable un-
der that rule, we have looked not only to the rules of profes-
sional conduct but also to Rule 11 of the civil rules, which
makes it sanctionable misconduct for a lawyer to sign a
As a result, the Saturn Systems court sanctioned the plaintiff's counsel
under Civil Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, id. at 871-72, but it did not explain
what it would have done if it had found a violation of the relevant litigation
ethics rules.
73. 986 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1993).
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pleading or other paper, including a brief, if he has failed to
make a reasonable inquiry into whether his position "is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law." Reasonable inquiry would have turned up
[the controlling case]. 74
74. Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
In a similar vein, in Loftus v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority, 8 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff'd mem., 187 F.3d 626 (3d
Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 (1999),
the court imposed sua sponte sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 on the plain-
tiff's counsel, as Civil Rule 11 was not available under the circumstances of
the case, as follows:
"In determining whether imposition of the sanctions contemplated
by § 1927 is called for, the question to be addressed is whether the at-
torney sought to be sanctioned is fairly chargeable with actions taken
which are tantamount to willful bad faith." The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has stated that the "intentional advancement of a
baseless contention that is made for an ulterior purpose, e.g., harass-
ment or delay" may be indicative of bad faith. When a claim is advo-
cated despite the fact that it is patently frivolous or where a litigant
continues to pursue a claim in the face of an irrebuttable defense, bad
faith can be implied. Additionally, "even if a lawsuit was initially
filed in good faith, sanctions may be imposed on an attorney for all
costs and fees incurred after the continuation of the lawsuit which is
deemed to be in bad faith." "Courts, however, should be cautious in
awarding counsel fees for fear of chilling the [litigants] exercise of
constitutional rights."
A number of factors serve to convince the Court that the continuing
prosecution of this case by [the plaintiff's counsel], once the Third
Circuit had decided the [adverse controlling] case, was in willful bad
faith. First, the material facts underlying the [that] case and [the plain-
tiff's] case were identical, i.e., both the [adverse controlling case]
plaintiff and the instant plaintiff were terminated by [the defendant]
for violation of [the defendant's] drug and alcohol testing policies and
each sought to arbitrate their grievances pursuant to the same collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Second, the legal theories advanced in
Count II of the [adverse controlling] case were identical to those ad-
vanced in the instant case, i.e., each plaintiff claimed that [the defen-
dant] and [the union] conspired to deprive him of his due process right
to pursue his grievances to arbitration. Third, the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in [the adverse controlling case] that the claim was flawed be-
cause, under state law, [the adverse controlling case plaintiff] had a
right to petition the court of common pleas to compel arbitration, was
equally applicable to the instant case. Fourth, on November, 16, 1995,
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Thus, the Hendrix court regarded noncompliance with Model
Rule 3.3 and Civil Rule 11 as one way to infer delay prohibited by
Appellate Rule 38, which is the appellate frivolous conduct sanctions
rule, but it did so within the context of a possible disciplinary pro-
ceeding as well.
In Estate of Washington v. United States Secretary of Health &
Human Services,75 the Tenth Circuit refused to sanction the plaintiff
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or Appellate Rule 38, even though the plain-
tiff was found to be liable on the underlying claim, because the de-
fendant's failure to cite controlling adverse authority was found to
nine days after the Third Circuit rendered its decision in [the adverse
controlling case], counsel for [the defendant] sent a letter to [the plain-
tiff's counsel] which cited [the adverse controlling case] and informed
[him] that, based on [it], the claim asserted in [this case] was without
legal or factual basis. Fifth, [the plaintiff's counsel] knew from past
experience of his duty to discontinue litigation when an intervening
event had rendered the litigation frivolous because he had been previ-
ously sanctioned in this court for pursuing a case after the Third Cir-
cuit had decided a case with "uncannily parallel fact pattern and a
similar litany of legal theories" in a manner adverse to [the plaintiff's
counsel's] case.
In his defense, [the plaintiff's counsel] appears to argue that, under
our adversarial system of justice, he is not obligated to bring to the
court's attention developments which are adverse to his client. [He]
believes that such duty rests solely with his adversaries. In [his]
words: "its not up to me to... stop representing my client because
something happened. It's up to [opposing counsel] to have brought
the [the adverse controlling case] result to the attention of the Court],
they're advocates of the other side." [The plaintiff's counsel's] view
of a lawyer's obligations to the court in the face of the frivolity of his
case is mistaken.
As the Third Circuit has observed: "an attorney's obligation to the
court is one that is unique and must be discharged with candor and
with great care." [sic] Simply put, once [the plaintiffs] claim lost le-
gal merit, [his counsel] had a duty to withdraw [from] the case. As an
officer of the court, [the plaintiffs counsel] was not free to press on
with a meritless claim until forced to surrender by the legal artillery of
his adversaries.
Id. at 461-62 (citations omitted, but citing Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.3 (describing attorney's duty of candor to the tribunal); Penn-
sylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous...
75. 53 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 1995).
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have been the frivolous conduct, and the court discussed Civil Rule
11 as follows:
The [e]state therefore owes the government $31,410.60.
This result may well have been reached far earlier, and at
far less cost, if the government had been more forthcoming
about the authority supporting its rejection of the
[e]state's... theory. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct focus, respectively, on a movant's burden of "rea-
sonable inquiry," and a lawyer's duty to disclose adverse
controlling authority, as a means of protecting the judici-
ary's efficiency and integrity. Unfortunately, these rules do
not protect lawyers from one another. Nevertheless, we
think that counsel in the future would be well-advised to
remember the spirit of the general standards enunciated in
Canon 1 of the A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility ("A lawyer should assist in maintaining the in-
tegrity and competence of the legal profession."), and
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5)
(a lawyer shall not engage in "conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice").
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure pro-
vides that "[i]f a court of appeals shall determine that an
appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee." An appeal is considered
"frivolous" when "the result is obvious, or the appellant's
arguments of error are wholly without merit." To our mind,
the present appeal is not "frivolous." ...
We likewise refuse to compensate the government for its
litigation costs by sanctioning the [e]state's attorneys under
28 U.S.C. § 1927. Their conduct does not rise to the level
of recklessness or indifference that this Circuit has required
to sanction an attorney under [section] 1927. Indeed, we
find the government's charge that the [e]state has multiplied
proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously to be highly
ironic, given its own reluctance to disclose to the [e]state
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the existence of cases that might well have shortened, or
even avoided, the underlying litigation.76
Thus, the Estate of Washington court relied upon the govern-
ment's noncompliance with Model Rule 3.3 to support its rejection
of sanctions against the estate, yet it did not explain why it was doing
so, when it had already affirmatively found that the appeal was not
frivolous.
While dicta, the court's statement, as follows, does not make
any sense either:
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule
3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct focus, re-
spectively, on a movant's burden of "reasonable inquiry,"
and a lawyer's duty to disclose adverse controlling author-
ity, as a means of protecting the judiciary's efficiency and
integrity. Unfortunately, these rules do not protect lawyers
from one another.7
Specifically, while these rules are certainly aimed at protecting
the court, they are without question aimed at protecting the adverse
parties as well.78
Finally, in Duran v. Carris,79 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs second amended complaint. In doing so,
it commented on the ghostwriting of the appellant's brief by his for-
mer attorney, in response to the appellee's motion for appellate sanc-
tions-which it rejected sub silentio, and it discussed Civil Rule 11
as follows:
This court is concerned with attorneys who "author[]
pleadings and necessarily guide[] the course of the litigation
with an unseen hand." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (a) requires that
"every [sic] pleading, written motion, and other paper shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name, or if the party is not represented by an at-
torney, shall be signed by the party." [The attorney's] ac-
tions in providing substantial legal assistance to [the plain-
76. Id. at 1176 (citations omitted).
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2003) (requiring
fairness to opposing party and counsel).
79. 238 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001).
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tiff] without entering an appearance in this case not only af-
fords [him] the benefit of this court's liberal construction of
pro se pleadings, but also inappropriately shields [the attor-
ney] from responsibility and accountability for his actions
and counsel.
As stated in a recent law review article:
The duty of candor toward the court mandated by
Model Rule 3.3 is particularly significant to ghostwrit-
ten pleadings. If neither a ghostwriting attorney nor
her pro se litigant client disclose the fact that any
pleadings ostensibly filed by a self-represented litigant
were actually drafted by the attorney, this could itself
violate the duty of candor. The practice of undisclosed
ghostwriting might be particularly problematic in light
of the special leniency afforded pro se pleadings in the
courts. This leniency is designed to* compensate for
pro se litigants' lack of legal assistance. Thus, if courts
mistakenly believe that the ghostwritten pleading was
drafted without legal assistance, they might apply an
unwarranted degree of leniency to a pleading that was
actually drafted with the assistance of counsel. This
situation might create confusion for the court and un-
fairness toward opposing parties. It is therefore likely
that the failure to disclose ghostwriting assistance to
courts and opposing parties amounts to a failure to
"disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client," which is prohibited by Model Rule
3.3. Undisclosed ghostwriting would also likely qual-
ify, as professional misconduct under Model Rules
8.4(c) and (d), prohibiting conduct involving a misrep-
resentation, and conduct that is prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice, respectively.
It is disingenuous for [the plaintiff and his attorney] to ar-
gue that ghost writing represents a positive contribution
such as reduced fees or pro bono representation. Either of
these kinds of professional representation are analogous to
the concept of rescue in the field of torts. A lawyer usually
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has no obligation to provide reduced fee or pro bono repre-
sentation; that is a matter of conscience and professional-
ism. Once either kind of representation is undertaken, how-
ever, it must be undertaken competently and ethically or
liability will attach to its provider.
Competence requires that a lawyer conduct a reasonable
inquiry and determine that a filed pleading is not presented
for an improper purpose, the positions taken are nonfrivo-
lous, and the facts presented are well grounded. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 (b). Ethics requires that a lawyer acknowledge
the giving of his advice by the signing of his name. Besides
the imprimatur of professional competence such a signature
carries, its absence requires us to construe matters differ-
ently for the litigant, as we give pro se litigants liberal
treatment, precisely because they do not have lawyers.
We determine that the situation as presented here consti-
tutes a misrepresentation to this court by litigant and attor-
ney. Other jurisdictions have similarly condemned the
practice of ghost writing pleadings.
We recognize that, as of yet, we have not defined what
kind of legal advice given by an attorney amounts to "sub-
stantial" assistance that must be disclosed to the court. To-
day, we provide some guidance on the matter. We hold that
the participation by an attorney in drafting an appellate
brief is per se substantial, and must be acknowledged by
signature. In fact, we agree with the New York City Bar's
ethics opinion that "an attorney must refuse to provide
ghostwriting assistance unless the client specifically com-
mits herself to disclosing the attorney's assistance to the
court upon filing." We caution, however, that the mere as-
sistance of drafting, especially before a trial court, will not
totally obviate some kind of lenient treatment due a sub-
stantially pro se litigant. We hold today, however, that any
ghostwriting of an otherwise pro se brief must be acknowl-
edged by the signature of the attorney involved.
Finally, in response to this court's show cause order, [the
attorney] claimed the high ground for "representing" [the
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plaintiff] on appeal at a reduced fee. He suggest[ed] that
his representation of [the plaintiff] in the trial court afforded
him enough familiarity with the case to be able to offer [the
plaintiff] assistance with his appeal at a much reduced fee.
We note the irony in [the attorney's] rationalization that he
should be commended for assisting [the plaintiff] on appeal
at a reduced rate and yet failing to continue that representa-
tion on appeal, or to even acknowledge that some form of
assistance was given. We do not allow anonymous testi-
mony in court; nor does this circuit allow ghostwritten
briefs. Therefore, we admonish [the attorney] that this be-
havior will not be tolerated by this court, and future viola-
tions of this admonition will result in the possible imposi-
tion of sanctions.8 °
Thus, the Duran court used Model Rule 3.3 in dicta to declare
that ghostwriting violated Civil Rule 11 in the appellate context,
even though Civil Rule 11 does not apply to appellate proceedings in
the Tenth Circuit81 or generally anywhere else.8
As shown by the above discussion, none of these courts used the
Model Rules to develop a standard by which to measure Civil Rule
11, despite the fact that they used the Model Rules as a reference
point to some degree or another. More importantly, none of these
courts explained why they were not developing such a standard.
B. Litigation Ethics Rules Rejected as Civil Rule 11 Standard
In contrast to the discussion above, in Golden Eagle Distributing
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,83 the Ninth Circuit reversed sanctions
80. Id. at 1271-73 (citations and footnotes omitted).
81. E.g., Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 n.4 (10th Cir. 1987)
("Since its amendment in 1983, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 has become increasingly
important as a source of the courts' authority to impose monetary sanctions,
including attorney's fees, against attorneys personally. But Rule 11, while its
language is inclusive, empowers the imposition of sanctions at the trial court
level, not on appeal." (citations omitted)).
82. Cf Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405-08 (1990)
(suggesting that the standards under Appellate Rule 38 and Civil Rule 11 may
be different); see generally VAIRO, supra note 16, § 3.03[b] (discussing appel-
late sanctions for papers filed in the court of appeals).
83. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
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against the defendant's counsel that had been awarded for a violation
of the litigation ethics rules, and it flatly rejected the view that these
rules have anything to do with Civil Rule 11:
The district court's application of Rule 11 in this case
strikes a chord not otherwise heard in discussion of this
Rule. The district court did not focus on whether a sound
basis in law and in fact existed for the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Indeed it indicated that the motion
itself was nonfrivolous. Rather, the district court looked to
the manner in which the motion was presented. The district
court in this case held that Rule 11 imposes upon counsel
an ethical "duty of candor." The court drew its principles
from Rule 3.3 of the ABA's Model Rules and the accompa-
nying comment. It said:
The duty of candor is a necessary corollary of the
certification required by Rule 11. A court has a right to
expect that counsel will state the controlling law fairly
and fully; indeed, unless that is done the court cannot
perform its task properly. A lawyer must not misstate
the law, fail to disclose adverse authority (not disclosed
by his opponent), or omit facts critical to the applica-
tion of the rule of law relied on.
With the district court's salutary admonitions against mis-
statements of the law, failure to disclose directly adverse
authority, or omission of critical facts, we have no quarrel.
It is, however, with Rule 11 that we must deal. The district
court's interpretation of Rule 11 requires district courts to
judge the ethical propriety of lawyers' conduct with respect
to every piece of paper filed in federal court. This gives us
considerable pause.
We need not here definitively resolve the problems of the
proper role of the courts in enforcing the ethical obligations
of lawyers. We must consider only whether Rule 11 re-
quires the courts to enforce ethical standards of advocacy
beyond the terms of the Rule itself.
The district court's invocation of Rule 11 has two aspects.
The first, which we term "argument identification" is the
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holding that counsel should differentiate between an argu-
ment "warranted by existing law" and an argument for the
"extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." The
second is the conclusion that Rule 11 is violated when
counsel fails to cite what the district court views to be di-
rectly contrary authority. We deal with each in turn, noting
at the outset that many of our observations are applicable to
both aspects of the court's interpretation of Rule 11.
We look first to the text of Rule 11. It requires that the
lawyer certify that a pleading, motion or other paper is
"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." The
district court held that the lawyer in this case had a good
faith argument for the extension of the law, but violated
Rule 11 when he characterized his position as warranted by
existing law.
The text of the Rule, however, does not require that coun-
sel differentiate between a position which is supported by
existing law and one that would extend it. The Rule on its
face requires that the motion be either one or the other.
Moreover, there is nothing in any of the statements of the
proponents of the amended Rule or in the authorities we
have surveyed since its adoption which suggests such a re-
quirement.
The district court's ruling appears to go even beyond the
principle of Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model Rules which pro-
scribes "knowing" false statements of material fact or law.
The district court made no finding of a knowing misstate-
ment, and, given the well-established objective nature of the
Rule 11 standard, such a requirement would be inappropri-
ate. Both the earnest advocate exaggerating the state of the
current law without knowingly misrepresenting it, and the
unscrupulous lawyer knowingly deceiving the court, are
within the scope of the district court's interpretation.
This gives rise to serious concerns about the effect of such
a rule on advocacy. It is not always easy to decide whether
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an argument is based on established law or is an argument
for the extension of existing law. Whether the case being
litigated is or is not materially the same as earlier precedent
is frequently the very issue which prompted the litigation in
the first place. Such questions can be close.
Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
does not impose upon the district courts the burden of
evaluating under ethical standards the accuracy of all law-
yers' arguments. Rather, Rule 11 is intended to reduce the
burden on district courts by sanctioning, and hence deter-
ring, attorneys who submit motions or pleadings which
cannot reasonably be supported in law or in fact.
84
Four judges on the Ninth Circuit dissented from the denial of a
rehearing en banc in Golden Eagle.85 They criticized the Golden
Eagle panel for distorting the district court's opinion and for trying
to divorce Civil Rule 11 from an attorney's ethical obligations, as
follows:
This case is not ordinary in the attention with which it has
been watched by the profession. Judge Schwarzer has writ-
ten a leading article on Rule 11, "Sanctions Under the New
Federal Rule lIl-A Closer Look," 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985).
Beyond the normal respect to be accorded the actions of a
district judge, acknowledgment is owed to a pioneer author-
ity on the Rule. We should also take into account that dis-
trict courts, more than appellate courts, are plagued by mis-
representations. We face them on occasion, but common
report has it that some trial lawyers are much less scrupu-
lous with trial judges, who do not have the staff or time an
appellate tribunal has to unmask misrepresentation. When
an outstanding district judge has said, "Enough. I'll deal
with misrepresentation under Rule 11," this court should at
least have responded to what he has actually done.
Denial of rehearing en banc does not foreclose the oppor-
tunity to point out where the opinion distorts what the dis-
84. Id. at 1538-40, 1542 (citations and footnotes omitted).
85. 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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trict court did, to underline certain difficulties the opinion
creates, and finally to point out alternative avenues that the
opinion does not cut off.
The standards of the Model Code are substantially fol-
lowed in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the
American Bar Association. Rule 3.3 under the heading,
"Candor Toward the Tribunal" makes it a black letter rule
that a lawyer should not knowingly "fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to the lawyer to be directly diverse [sic] to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Model
Rules 3.3(a)(3) [sic]. The note on this Rule goes on to say,
"Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation
of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. ... The
underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion
seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable
to the case."
In black letters the Model Rules also provide, "A lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or contro-
vert an issue therein unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."
Model Rule 3.1. Commentary on this Rule explicitly links
it to DR 7-102(A)(ii) [sic] of the Model Code.
Amazingly, the opinion of the court fails to acknowledge
the source for the language of Rule 11 that a paper should
be "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
Both the ABA's Model Rules, adopted on August 2, 1983,
and Rule 11, which became effective August 1, 1983, are
properly seen as based on DR 7-102(A)(ii) [sic] of the
Model Code in their treatment of what a lawyer should not
do. If the objective standard of Rule 11 is higher than the
subjective standard of Model Rule 3.3, that is no reason for
the court to ignore the link between Rule 11 and the ethical
standards of the bar.
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It is equally surprising that the opinion of the court does
not acknowledge that in the ABA's Model Rules, frivo-
lousness is specifically defined by the absence of "a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law." Frivolousness does not only consist, as the
court appears to assume, in making a baseless claim. Frivo-
lousness also consists in making a legal argument without a
good faith foundation.
... Not only does the opinion suggest a view of unre-
strained advocacy repudiated by modem authorities, it fa-
vors a type of analysis sponsored by the Eighth Circuit and
overruled by the Supreme Court. The opinion takes the po-
sition that a requirement of truthful argumentation "tends to
create a conflict between the lawyer's duty zealously to rep-
resent his client" and "the lawyer's own interest in avoiding
rebuke."
Precisely such an analysis was offered by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in relieving the lawyer of an obligation not to present
perjury. That court found "a conflict of interest" between
the lawyer's duty to represent his client zealously and the
lawyer's ethical duty not to present perjury. Reversing the
Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that there was no
conflict of duties when the lawyer was asked by his client
to assist "in the presentation of false testimony."
A client has as little right to the presentation of false ar-
guments as he has to the presentation of false testimony.
No conflict exists when a lawyer confines his advocacy by
his duty to the court. The opinion is insensitive and unre-
sponsive to the teaching of the Supreme Court that a re-
straint on the freedom of a lawyer to present falsity as truth
does not create any true conflict. The lawyer has a duty to
work within the boundaries of professional responsibility.
He is not free to suborn testimony, to perjure himself, to of-
fer perjured testimony, or to misrepresent facts or law. No
conflict exists between his duty to work within these re-
straints and his duty to his client. The opinion suggests that
there is the possibility of conflict over a duty to serve a cli-
ent and a duty not to misrepresent the law. Fidelity to the
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relevant opinion of the Supreme Court and to the modem
standards of the profession lead to a different conclusion. 6
In Golden Eagle, the Ninth Circuit judges seemed to be talking
past each other, but at least they were addressing the intersection of
legal ethics and professional responsibility with Civil Rule 11, which
is something that no other court of appeals has explicitly done.
Specifically, the panel's opinion was based upon the philosophy
that it is not the court's job to enforce litigation ethics rules through
Civil Rule 11, which is exactly what it said: "We need not here de-
finitively resolve the problems of the proper role of the courts in en-
forcing the ethical obligations of lawyers. We must consider only
whether Rule 11 requires the courts to enforce ethical standards of
advocacy beyond the terms of the Rule itself.,87 This philosophy
was buttressed by the extreme exaggeration that to do so would "re-
quire[] district courts to judge the ethical propriety of lawyers' con-
duct with respect to every piece of paper filed in federal court."
88
Obviously, the courts would only have to examine those papers
brought to their attention by motion or by their own choice sua
sponte.
89
What the panel probably meant was that, given the trial court's
finding that the relevant motion was nonfrivolous,90 it did not want to
have district courts abandoning the "Paper as a Whole" doctrine,91
which rejected sanctions, if the paper as a whole was nonfrivolous.92
Until its en banc decision in Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 93 the Ninth Circuit was the leading proponent of the "Paper as
a Whole" approach, which was also rejected by the 1993 amend-
ments to Civil Rule 11. 94 Even then, the Townsend court distin-
86. Id. at 584-85, 588-89 (citations omitted).
87. 801 F.2d at 1539 (footnote omitted).
88. Id.
89. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 7.03[d] (discussing how to raise a Civil
Rule 11 motion).
90. 801 F.2d at 1538.
91. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 4.01[e] (discussing the "Paper as a Whole"
controversy).
92. Id.
93. 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
94. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 4.01 [e] (discussing the "Paper as a Whole"
controversy).
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guished Golden Eagle, because that case "did not purport to deal
with unwarranted allegations or claims; rather it held that legal ar-
guments advanced by counsel do not violate Rule 11 simply by vir-
tue of the fact that counsel's conduct does not comport with ethical
rules of the American Bar Association."9 Thereafter and continuing
under the 1993 amendments, the duty of candor has been the litigated
topic arising out of Golden Eagle,9 and the underlying concept ad-
vocated by the rehearing en banc denial dissent, that Civil Rule 11 is
inextricably intertwined with the litigation ethics rules, seems to have
fallen by the wayside.
C. Litigation Ethics Rules Adopted as Civil Rule 11 Standard
Several federal courts have had occasion to find that a violation
of the relevant litigation ethics rules could be equated with a Civil
Rule 11 violation.
For instance, in Glover v. Libman,97 the district court sanctioned
two of the plaintiffs and their counsel, who had filed a frivolous mo-
tion to disqualify, and it discussed Civil Rule 11 as follows:
The court, however, finds that given the conduct of [the
attorney and his clients] at both the relevant time at which
these events occurred and the hearing of the instant motion,
the motion for disqualification was brought solely for tacti-
cal reasons, and not for any sensitivity to ethical concerns.
This court firmly believes that such conduct cannot be con-
doned and in fact warrants sanctions of its own. Pursuant to
DR 1-103(A), one has a duty to move to disqualify when-
ever there is a non-trivial possibility of a conflict of interest.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the signature of an attorney "constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to his best knowl-
edge, information, and belief there is good ground to sup-
port it; and that it is not interposed for delay." Further-
more, Model Rule 3.2 provides as follows: "A lawyer shall
95. 929 F.2d at 1363.
96. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 5.03[c][1 & 2] (discussing the duty of dis-
closure).
97. 578 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interests of the client."
Similarly, DR 7-102(A)(1) provides that, "A lawyer shall
not.., file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense [or]
delay a trial... when he knows or when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously in-
jure another." In the Comment to the Model Rule, the
[American] Bar [Association] states the following: "Delay
should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the
advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing
party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. ... Re-
alizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper
delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the cli-
ent."
98
As a result, the Glover court sanctioned two of the co-plaintiffs
and their counsel for having violated the relevant litigation ethics
rules, which it equated with frivolous conduct violative of Civil Rule
11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's local rules. 99
Of importance, the Glover court noted that:
[It] has the power and responsibility to regulate the con-
duct of attorneys who practice before it. This is essential to
both the quality and appearance of justice.
In evaluating the issues brought by this motion, this court
is guided by the standard of professional conduct of the
members of the bar of this court, which includes "the cur-
rent canons of professional ethics of the American Bar As-
sociation." Accordingly, the court is guided by the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct .... 10o
Thus, the Glover court used the litigation ethics rules as a guide-
line for evaluating Civil Rule 11 motions.
98. Id. at 769 (citation corrected; incorrect block quote reformatted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 750 (quoting Local Court Rule 71.54).
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In In re Ronco, Inc. ,101 the district court sanctioned the attorneys
for the creditor's committee under Civil Rule 11 after observing that:
[I]t is not a coincidence that the newly-inserted language in
Rule 11 ... [the 1983 version] mirrors the standards in
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2)
and in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1
and its accompanying comment. All of them-Rule 11, the
DR and the Model Rule-teach that a lawyer's duty to his
or her client cannot be permitted to override his or her duty
to the justice system, defined by all three of those rules.
10 2
Thus, the Ronco court specifically used Model Rule 3.1 to "de-
fine" the conduct violative of Civil Rule 11,103 which was the logical
next step from the Glover court.
In Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey,1°' the district court sanctioned
the plaintiff and its counsel under Civil Rule 11 after noting that:
Litigation lawyers have a broad responsibility under Rule
11 and the Code of Professional Responsibility (now the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct): to confer with the
client about the facts-and not to accept the client's version
on faith, but to probe the client in that respect ("reasonable
inquiry"); to do the lawyers' homework on the law; and
then to counsel the client about just which claims the law
reasonably supports in terms of the facts the lawyers'
proper investigation has disclosed. That often involves
counseling the client-sometimes against the tide of the cli-
ent's displeasure-as to how best to vindicate the client's
interests without abusing another's. In some instances that
may involve advising a client not to pursue a claim or a
theory of recovery that in a technical sense (of surviving a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion) might perhaps go forward, but by
rights should not. When a lawyer fails in that respect-
when a lawyer accepts or even encourages the role of a
101. 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal dismissed mem. & remanded,
793 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision), vacated & re-
manded, 838 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 497.
103. Id.
104. 611 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:819
"hired gun" in the worst sense-the costs to the parties and
to the courts are often substantial, as they have been here.
Just last week our Court of Appeals decided to issue...
an opinion [that] illustrates why Rule 11 applies to part, but
does not quite cover the bulk, of [the plaintiff's] Count I
and IIl claims (including the involvement of [the plaintiff's]
counsel in those claims):
Our system of jurisprudence is designed to insure [sic]
that all disputants with colorable claims have access to
the courthouse. Relatively low barriers to entry have,
however, generated an undesirable result-a deluge of
frivolous or vexatious claims filed by the uninformed,
the misinformed, and the unscrupulous. These claims
clog court dockets and threaten to undermine the abil-
ity of the judiciary to efficiently administer the press of
cases properly before it. Perhaps the greatest safeguard
against this danger is the integrity and good sense of
practicing lawyers who, as officers of the court, have
both an ethical and a legal duty to screen the claims of
their clients for factual veracity and legal sufficiency.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (1983);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Lawyers have a unique opportunity
to counsel restraint or recklessness, to craft imaginative
arguments or to press empty challenges to well-settled
principles. Because of our reluctance to constrain the
discretion of attorneys in the vigorous advocacy of
their clients' interests, we penalize them only where
they have failed to maintain a minimum standard of
professional responsibility. But we will not overlook
such a failure when it occurs, in part because it evi-
dences disdain for the public, whose claims lie dormant
because frivolous suits have diverted away scarce judi-
cial resources, disdain for adversaries, who must ex-
pend time and money to defend against meritless at-
tacks, and disdain for clients, whose trust is rewarded
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with legal bills, dismissals, and court-imposed sanc-
tions.
105
Thus, like the Glover and Ronco courts, the Fleming Sales court
linked Model Rule 3.1 with Civil Rule 11.
In Pope v. Federal Express Corp.,10 6 the district court, in sanc-
tioning the plaintiff and her attorney under Civil Rule 11, stated that:
When [the] plaintiff testified repeatedly at her supplemen-
tal deposition on October 12, 1989 that she had received the
original note on her desk, and that she was definite that the
note had original writing, written on paper with some type
or writing instrument by a human being, she was testifying
falsely because an original document as she described never
existed. It was and is impossible for such an original
document to exist. The court has examined Exhibit 203 and
the transparent plastic overlays made from it. The court has
positioned each word of the you "feel" good! statement
from the transparent overlay on each corresponding word of
[the] [d]efendants [sic] Exhibits FEL 42 and FEL 124. The
court has observed that the words match perfectly; even
better than if they had been traced. One need not be an ex-
pert to see that [t]he you "feel" good! statement was manu-
factured from a copy of either of [the] [d]efendants [sic]
Exhibits FEL 42 or 124, then was pasted on a copy of the
sales goal document, and a photocopy was made.
[The] [p]laintiff's attorney had the same opportunity to
make such examination on October 12, 1989, and thereaf-
ter. [The] [p]laintiff's attorney hearing plaintiff testify at
that deposition that she had the original document on the
date she claimed it was placed on her desk [sic]. At that
time, [the] plaintiffs attorney was put on notice that her
client was testifying falsely. If [the] plaintiff's attorney had
any doubts that Exhibit 203 was manufactured she should
105. Id. at 519-20 (quoting Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th
Cir. 1985) (emphasis added; some alterations in original), cert. denied sub
nom. Hyde v. Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 827 (1985)).
106. 138 F.R.D. 675 (W.D. Mo. 1990), modified, 138 F.RD. 684 (W.D. Mo.
1991), modified, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7760 (W.D. Mo. June 6, 1991), aff'd
in part, vacated in relevant part & remanded, 974 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1992).
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have had it examined and compared to [the] [d]efendants'
Exhibits FEL 42 and FEL 124. [The] [p]laintiffs attorney
saw in the deposition how defense counsel had examined
and compared Exhibit 203 with the otherfxhibits, so [the]
plaintiff's counsel easily could have commissioned a sepa-
rate test to verify the contention of fabricated evidence. An
independent test would have satisfied [the] plaintiff's coun-
sel whether an original writing ever could have existed, or it
was a cut-and-paste job such that an original never could
have existed. Upon making a finding that the evidence was
manufactured, [the] plaintiffs attorney had an ethical re-
sponsibility to stop relying on Exhibit 203 as evidence in
[the] plaintiffs case.
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 3.1 on Professional Con-
duct provides: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a pro-
ceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which in-
cludes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law ......
Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., provides: "The signature of an at-
torney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of the signor's knowledge, information and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact...."
[The] [p]laintiffs answers to interrogatories, her re-
sponses to requests for production, her motion for sanctions
against defendants, her first and second amended designa-
tions of experts and of events giving rise to allegations of
Title VII violations, and her supplemental deposition testi-
mony on October 12, 1989, all constituted violations of
Rule 11. Those pleadings were certified by [the] plaintiff,
or her counsel on her behalf, when plaintiff knew the plead-
ings were not well-grounded in fact. By relying upon Ex-
hibit 203, when [the] plaintiff knew it was false, she was in-
terposing those pleadings for improper purposes, including
harassment and a needless increase in litigation costs.
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The findings herein lead the court to conclude over-
whelmingly that [the] plaintiff violated Rule 11. Further-
more, the inescapable conclusion must be that [the] plain-
tiff's attorney was in violation of Rule 11 from and after
October 12, 1989.107
So like the Glover, Ronco, and Fleming Sales courts, the Pope
court specifically linked Model Rule 3.1 with Civil Rule 11.
In D.C.L Computer Systems, Inc. v. Pardini,'0 8 in sanctioning
the plaintiffs' counsel under Civil Rule 11, the local rules of court,
and its inherent power, the district court noted in regards to in-court
misrepresentations and omissions as follows:
At the ex parte hearing on the Writ, all of [the] plaintiffs
[sic.] then counsel ... failed to inform the court of the state
court action and orders, made misrepresentations of the sort
contained in the papers, or failed to correct those misrepre-
sentations. [The] [p]laintiffs' attorneys concede their lack
of candor, but argue it was not material. This was an ex
parte proceeding, requiring more candor towards the court
than those counsel may be accustomed to providing. For
this reason and those discussed above, the court finds [the]
plaintiffs' then attorneys' lack of candor both highly mate-
rial and highly aggregious [sic].
These in-court misrepresentations and omissions are not
sanctionable under Rule 11, as Rule 11 does not apply to
oral misrepresentations. However, [the] plaintiffs attor-
neys' conduct did violate the Local Rules of the Eastern
District of California. Local Rule 110 provides that:
Failure of counsel ... to comply with these Rules...
107. Id. at 681-82. But cf Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99-
Civ.-10175-(JSM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 491 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (issu-
ing, sua sponte, non-monetary Rule 11 sanctions against defense counsel for
submitting a false affidavit in violation of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) using an objec-
tive standard), vacated sub nom. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86
(2d Cir. 2003) (requiring a showing of subjective bad faith for sua sponte Rule
11 sanctions).
108. No. CV-F-89-268-REC, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16476 (E.D. Cal. June
20, 1990), affid, 978 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision),
opinion available at 992 U.S. App. LEXIS 29951.
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may be ground for imposition by the Court of any and
all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the
inherent power of the Court, including, without limita-
tion, dismissal of any action, entry of default, finding
of contempt, imposition of monetary sanctions or at-
torneys' fees and costs, and other lesser sanctions.
Local Rule 180(e), "Standards of Professional Conduct,"
requires that attorneys follow various ethical codes, includ-
ing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. These rules expressly require candor
in ex parte proceedings. ABA Model Rule 3.3, "Candor
toward the Tribunal," provides: In an ex parte proceeding,
a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts
known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make
an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
A court may impose attorney's fees under the Local Rules
if it finds counsel acted in bad faith, willfully, recklessly, or
with gross negligence. [The] [p]laintiffs' attorneys' in-
court omissions and misrepresentations at the very least
were grossly negligent. Indeed, the court is convinced that
counsel were attempting to circumvent state court discovery
orders and deliberately failed to inform the court of those
orders and that action. Thus, the court finds that [the plain-
tiffs' attorneys] willfully and in bad faith failed to inform
the court of material facts at the ex parte hearing, and are li-
able for attorney's fees under the Local Rules.
109
Thus, the D. C.L Computer Systems court used its local rules,
which incorporated the Model Rules, to sanction the plaintiffs' coun-
sel, because the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11 did not cover oral
statements, which are now covered under the "later advocating" pro-
109. Id. at *7-*10 (citation omitted).
This case was decided under the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11, but un-
der the 1993 version, oral misrepresentations are covered under the "later ad-
vocating" provision of the rule, and thus this case would support a relationship
between the current version of Civil Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.3. See gener-
ally VAIRO, supra note 16, § 4.02[d] (discussing oral assertions under both the
1983 and 1993 version of Civil Rule 11).
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vision of the 1993 version of Civil Rule 11.110 Had the D. C.I Com-
puter Systems court been dealing with the current version of Civil
Rule 11, assumably it would have found the same link between the
litigation ethics rules and Civil Rule 11 that was described by the
Glover, Ronco, Fleming Sales, and Pope courts.
In Storment v. Gossage,111 in entering sua sponte Civil Rule 11
sanctions against the plaintiff, the district court noted in denying the
plaintiff's own motion for sanctions that:
[The plaintiff] asserts that [the defendant's] supplemental
response should be stricken under [Civil Rule] 12(f) and
that she should be sanctioned under Rule 11 and Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(9). Rule 12(f) allows the
court to strike any pleading that is impertinent or scandal-
ous. Rule 11 provides for sanctions against an attorney
who files a pleading that is not grounded in existing fact or
filed for an improper purpose. Illinois RPC 3.3(9) states
that a lawyer shall not "intentionally degrade a... person
by stating or alluding to personal facts concerning that per-
son which are not relevant to the case[.]"
The [c]ourt notes that people who live in glass houses
shouldn't throw stones. [The plaintiffs] language in his re-
ply to the motion to remand clearly fails to meet the stan-
dards for professional conduct enunciated in RPC 3.3(9).
His accusation that [the] [d]efendants tried to conceal the
alleged existence of a partnership by changing the sign out-
side of their office is a fine example of alluding to personal
facts which are not relevant to the case in view of the fact
that [the] [d]efendants changed their sign, well before [the]
[p]laintiff began this vendetta, for unrelated reasons.
As for [the defendant's] supplemental response which ac-
cused [the plaintiff] of having a series of shortcomings in-
cluding lack of good judgment and dishonesty, this [c]ourt
notes that those unflattering characterizations are not with-
out factual support. In In re Marriage of Granger, the court
stated:
110. FED.R.CIv.P. 11.
111. 791 F. Supp. 215 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
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[The plaintiff] has attempted to... character[ize] the
disputed statements and conversations here [between
Plaintiff and Ms. Granger] as a legitimate effort on his
part to determine the facts from his client and to formu-
late a strategy to counter obviously damning testimony
from an unexpected, adverse witness. We cannot ac-
cept this view. The clear import of those conversations
[between Plaintiff and Ms. Granger] and statements is
that [Plaintiff] urged his client to commit perjury ...
There was nothing subtle or ambiguous about his ap-
proach. Indeed, we cannot recall a more blatant disre-
gard for the provisions of Rule 7-102 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that in his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not "partici-
pate in the creation or preservation of evidence when
he knows or when it is obvious that the evidence is
false" or "counsel or assist his client in conduct that the
lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
[The plaintiff's] violation of the canons of ethics is
for other authorities to pursue. We note, however, that
in advising his client to lie, [the plaintiff] did more than
breach his ethical obligations. He appears to have
committed a criminal offense, attempt to suborn per-
jury.
Although this Court IN NO WAY CONDONES slinging
mud at other parties-regardless of the truth of the asser-
tions-it finds, in light of the Granger opinion and plead-
ings filed by [the plaintiff], that [the defendant] did have a
factual basis for the statements she made concerning him.
Furthermore, as previously noted, [the plaintiff] initiated
the volley of cheap shots when he implied that [the defen-
dants] had improper motives for changing their business
sign. Naturally, once [the plaintiff] made such an accusa-
tion, [the] [d]efendants were entitled to respond. Conse-
quently, this Court cannot find that [the defendant] violated
Rule 11 or Illinois RPC 3.3(9).
However, this [c]ourt must note that if it weren't for the
fact that this case will be closed and barred from refiling on
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the basis of [the defendant's] motion for summary judg-
ment, this [c]ourt would have stricken [the plaintiffs] reply
to [the defendant's] initial response and [the defendant's]
supplemental response and ordered that new ones be filed.
But, for the sake of everyone, including the taxpayer who
provides our court systems, this [c]ourt wants to end this
matter post haste. Although it understands the frustration
that [the defendant] is going through as a result of [the
plaintiff's] OUTRAGEOUS and ATROCIOUS behavior,
nevertheless, this Court must caution that it expects and
demands that the attorneys who appear before it conduct
themselves in a professional manner and not cast aspersions
on the characters of opposing parties when the same point
could be made absent such conduct.
1 12
Thus, the Storment court, like the other cases discussed in this
subsection above, equated Model Rule 3.1 with Civil Rule 11.
In Giangrasso v. Kittatinny Regional High School Board of
Education,113 the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report
and recommendation and sanctioned the plaintiffs counsel under
Civil Rule 11 as well as the court's local rules as follows (in addition
to monetary penalties that were imposed):
[The] court may impose non-monetary sanctions where ap-
propriate to deter future violation of Rule 11. Therefore, to
ensure that [the plaintiff's counsel] will not continue to file
frivolous suits against defendants, I recommend that the
court permanently enjoin [him] from filing, as an attorney,
any complaint in this court involving [the defendant]. To
protect other parties from similar abuse, I also recommend
that the court direct the [c]lerk to refuse to accept any other
complaint [the plaintiff's counsel] attempts to file, unless
and until the complaint is approved for filing by the duty
judge sitting on the day of the attempted filing.
The [Advisory] Committee Notes on the revision of Rule
112. Id. at 218-20 (some alterations in original) (quoting In re Marriage of
Granger, 197 Ill. App. 3d 363, 375-76, 554 N.E.2d 586, 594 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (some alterations in original; quotation marks corrected)).
113. 865 F. Supp. 1133 (D.N.J. 1994).
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11 recognize that "the court has available a variety of pos-
sible sanctions to impose for violations, such as... refer-
ring the matter to disciplinary authorities." Moreover, Lo-
cal Rule 7(E) codifies the court's traditional authority to
supervise and monitor the conduct of attorneys admitted to
practice. Local Rule 7(E)(2) provides that: "[w]hen mis-
conduct or allegations of misconduct which, if substanti-
ated, would warrant discipline of an attorney, shall come to
the attention of a Judge of this Court, and the applicable
procedure is not otherwise mandated by these Rules, that
Judge shall refer the matter in writing to the Chief Judge."
During the course of this litigation, [the plaintiffs coun-
sel] has violated several Rules of Professional Conduct. By
filing this lawsuit, [the plaintiff's counsel] violated R.P.C.
3.1, which prohibits an attorney from bringing a frivolous
proceeding. [The plaintiffs counsel] repeatedly failed to
meet case management deadlines, therefore violating R.P.C.
3.2. Rule 3.2 directs attorneys to make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation. In failing to file opposition to a disposi-
tive motion, [the plaintiffs counsel] appears to have vio-
lated R.P.C. 1.3, which requires that an attorney act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a cli-
ent.
[The plaintiffs counsel's] appalling conduct in attempting
to serve subpoenas at [defendants' counsels' office], which
I find to have been an abuse of process, appears to have
violated R.P.C. 8.4(d). Rule 8.4(d) prohibits an attorney
from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the admini-
stration of justice. Moreover, his misrepresentation to the
court regarding the existence of the OAL petition filed by
his parents appears to have violated R.P.C. 8.4(c).
Based on the foregoing examples of [the plaintiffs coun-
sel's] misconduct in this litigation, I recommend that the
court refer the matter to [the] Chief Judge..., pursuant to
Rule 11 and Local Rule 7(E)(2), for such investigation and
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further proceedings as may be deemed appropriate. 114
Yet again, the Giangrasso court, like the other cases discussed
in this subsection above, equated violations of several Model Rules
with Civil Rule 11 sanctions.
In Frye v. Pena,l 5 the district court denied the plaintiff's motion
for Rule 11 sanctions, and it ordered him to show cause as to why he
should not be sanctioned under Civil Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and
the court's local rules, as follows:
[Numerous cases] establish that [the plaintiff's counsel]
knew his legal arguments in this case were "unwarranted by
existing law" and that they could not be considered "non-
frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or re-
versal of existing law" in violating of Fed. R. Civ. P.
1 l(b)(2). Indeed, [the plaintiff's counsel] has been sanc-
tioned by district courts for his obstinacy apparently with-
out effect.
Under ER 3.1, "[a] lawyer shall not bring... a proceed-
ing, or assert or controvert an issue... unless there is a ba-
sis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law." Rules of Professional Conduct, ER 3.1. A
lawyer is ethically obligation [sic] to exhibit candor to the
court: "A lawyer shall not knowingly, make a false state-
ment of material fact or law to a tribunal." ER 3.3(a)(1).
[The plaintiff's counsel's] conduct in this case implicates
both of those rules. Under Local Rule 1.6(a), "any member
of the bar of the Court may be disbarred or otherwise disci-
plined after such hearing as the Court may in each particu-
lar instance direct." The [c]ourt shall consider application
of Rule 1.6 to this case.
One final point, federal law provides:
114. Id. at 1142-43 (citation omitted).
115. No. CIV-97-10-TUC-RMB, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16966 (D. Ariz.
May 19, 1997), modified, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16453 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2,
1997), affrd mem., 199 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision),
opinion available at 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26903, cert. denied sub nom. Frye
v. Slater, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
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Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct
cases in any court of the United States or any Territory
thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927.
In light of the fact that the [c]ourt required [the plaintiff's
counsel] to re-evaluate the merits of this case and he chose
to proceed, sanctions under § 1927 may be appropriate.
Based on the foregoing, [the plaintiff's counsel] shall be
required to show cause hearing as to why attorney should
not be sanctioned for violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(1) and
(2), Ethical Rules 3.1 and 3.3(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and
this [c]ourt's... Order. The [c]ourt will consider whether
action under Local Rule 1.6 and a complaint to the State
Bar of Arizona is appropriate. [The plaintiff's counsel] is
directed to address the applicability of each of these viola-
tions in his brief. In response, [the] [d]efendants are to
submit an accounting of their attorneys' fees to be consid-
ered as one of the appropriate sanctions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [the plaintiffs counsel]
shall file a brief on... why he should not be disbarred from
practicing in the District Court of Arizona, why a State Bar
Complaint should not be filed and why he should not be
sanctioned for violations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, E.R. 3.1 and
3.3(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1927; and th[is] [c]ourt's... Or-
der.
116
Thereafter, the Frye court discussed the plaintiffs counsel's
ethical obligations as follows:
A lawyer practicing in federal court in Arizona is required
to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct as set forth in
Rule 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of
116. Id. at *21-*25 (citations omitted).
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Arizona. See Rules of Practice of the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona, Rule 1.6(d). Under Ari-
zona's ER 3.1, "[a] lawyer shall not bring.., a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue... unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of ex-
isting law." 17A A.R.S. S. Ct. Rules, Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 42, ER 3.1 (1985). A lawyer is also ethi-
cally obligated to exhibit candor to the court: "A lawyer
shall not knowingly, make a false statement of material fact
or law to a tribunal." Id. at ER 3.3(a)(1).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an at-
torney who files a pleading is:
[C]ertifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information and belief, formed after an inquiry reason-
able under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or need-
lessly increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(1) and (2). Thus, Rule 11 provides for
the imposition of sanctions when a filing is frivolous, le-
gally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is
brought for an improper purpose. Frivolous filings are
"those that are both baseless and made without a reasonable
and competent inquiry." A claim that is unfounded on ex-
isting law, but that straight-forwardly seeks a change in ex-
isting law that is not utterly implausible, should, in the ab-
sence of clear evidence of a different subjective intent, be
considered brought in good faith. That is not the case here.
Additionally, federal law provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct
cases in any court of the United States or any Territory
thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
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unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Section 1927 "applies only to unnecessary filings and tac-
tics once a lawsuit has begun." As such, an attorney is sub-
ject to sanctions under this section for all proceedings other
than the filing of the complaint. Before a court may engage
in any fee-shifting sanctions under § 1927, it must find that
"the attorney acted recklessly or in bad faith." The Ninth
Circuit has further defined this requirement to hold that sec-
tion 1927 sanctions "must be supported by a finding of sub-
jective bad faith." "Bad faith is present when an attorney
knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument or ar-
gues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an
opponent." 1
17
In considering the appropriate sanction to award, the Frye court
noted:
When determining an appropriate sanction, ABA Stan-
dard 3.0 suggests courts consider: (1) the duty violated; (2)
the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury
caused by the lawyer's conduct; and (4) the existence of
aggravating and mitigating factors. See ABA Standards For
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 3.0 (1986). Here, [the plain-
tiff's counsel] violated his ethical duty to this [c]ourt, op-
posing counsel and his client. The [c]ourt lacks the exper-
tise to question [the plaintiff's counsel's] mental state. The
expense of his lawsuits is well-documented. One mitigat-
ing factor is [the plaintiff's counsel's] respectful demeanor
at hearings. This does not excuse his conduct, however.
Therefore, the [c]ourt shall consider whether it is appropri-
117. Frye v. Pena, No. CIV-97-10-TUC-RMB, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16453, at *5-*8 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 1997) (citations omitted; paragraph structure
corrected), aff'd mem., 199 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table deci-
sion), opinion available at 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26903, cert. denied sub
nom. Frye v. Slater, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
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ate to impose [the] [d]efendants' attorneys fees and costs as
a sanction. 8
After considerable analysis, the Frye court sanctioned the plain-
tiff's counsel as follows: (1) disbarment from the federal courts in
Arizona, (2) an award of attorney's fees and expenses under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, (3) forfeiture of a bond towards the satisfaction of
these monetary sanctions, and (4) referral to the Arizona State Bar
Disciplinary Commission.'
9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed sanctions under Rule 11,
28 U.S.C. § 1927, and its inherent power, against the plaintiff's at-
torney, and it reasoned as follows:
[The plaintiff's attorney] filed a complaint challenging the
Department of Transportation's authority to suspend [the
plaintiff's] pilot certificate. The complaint also alleged that
the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA's") adminis-
trative proceedings violated [the plaintiff's] Fifth Amend-
ment due process rights, and that the FAA violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act by failing to publish its policies
regarding license penalties. [The plaintiff's attorney] had
previously filed numerous actions raising the same conten-
tions. The actions had been uniformly rejected.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
citing several Ninth Circuit cases where [the plaintiff's at-
torney] had personally raised the same frivolous claims.
The district court held a hearing on its order to show cause
as to why [the plaintiff's attorney] should not be disbarred
from practicing in the District Court of Arizona and should
not be sanctioned for violating Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Arizona Ethical Rules 3.1
and 3.3(a)(1). The district court found that [the plaintiff's
attorney]: (1) had filed a frivolous lawsuit in bad faith and
for the sole purpose of harassing defendants; (2) had made
intentional misstatements designed to mislead the court; (3)
had disobeyed the court's prior injunction precluding him
from filing similar lawsuits; and, (4) given the opportunity
118. Id. at *21-*22.
119. Id. at*32-*33.
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to dismiss the case, had refused to do so, thereby needlessly
multiplying the proceedings.
The district court then ordered [the plaintiffs attorney]:
(1) disbarred from the practice of law in the federal courts
of the District of Arizona; (2) to pay defendants reasonable
attorneys' fees in the amount of $34,117.68 and travel costs
in the amount of $578.51; and (3) to forfeit to defendants as
partial payment for assessed fees and costs a $20,000.00
bond the court had ordered [the plaintiff's attorney] to post
as a condition precedent to the court's granting discovery in
this case ...
We agree with the district court's careful, thorough, and
painstaking analysis of the issues presented in this case.
The district court's reasoning amply demonstrates that [the
plaintiffs attorney] brought and pressed frivolous claims,
made personal attacks on various government officials in
bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, and demon-
strated a lack of candor to, and contempt for, the court. The
district court was well within its discretion in imposing
monetary sanctions against Smith under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and in disbarring him under Rule 11.120
Thus, Frye presents the only instance where a circuit court
seems to have implicitly adopted a violation of the litigation ethics
rules as the Civil Rule 11 standard.
121
120. Frye v. Pena, 199 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table deci-
sion), opinion available at 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26903, at *2-*4 (citation
omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Frye v. Slater, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
121. The courts have been more willing to sanction attorneys under their in-
herent power for violations of other Model Rules, while side-stepping the Civil
Rule 11 issue. For instance, in Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales,
Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D.S.D. 2001), aff'd, 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003),
the district court sanctioned the defendant for its counsel's violation of the
anti-contact rule, Model Rule 4.2, by excluding certain evidence obtained in
violation of that rule from the trial. Id. at 1149. However, it refused to further
sanction defense counsel, because the court felt that the law had been some-
what unclear at the time of the infraction. Id. at 1159-60. In explaining its use
of its inherent power, rather than Civil Rule 11 or other discovery sanction
rules, the court stated that it "accept[ed] its responsibility to impose necessary
discipline on lawyers in order to assure preservation of the judicial process."
Id. at 1150. The district court's refusal to disqualify defense counsel or to im-
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Finally, in Obert v. Republic Western Insurance Co., 122 the dis-
trict court imposed sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927
against the defendant's counsel, as follows:
This matter is before the court on objections to the at-
tached Report and Recommendation of [the magistrate].
Objecting are [the defendant's] former attorneys in this
matter... admitted pro hac vice, as well as [the defen-
dant's] local counsel.., and their law firm ....
On May 1, 2002, this [c]ourt ordered pro hac vice counsel
to show cause why their pro hac vice status should not be
revoked based on their actions in pursuit of an unsuccessful
motion to recuse that they filed on behalf of their client. In
response to this [c]ourt's invitation, [the] [p]laintiff's attor-
neys also filed a motion for sanctions stemming from those
same activities.
This [c]ourt referred both matters to the magistrate judge,
who, after a two day hearing, concluded that [the two de-
fense counsel] had violated the Rhode Island Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct [Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5 & 8.4] and that
all defense counsel had violated Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The magis-
trate judge recommended revoking the pro hac vice status
of [the two defense counsel], and imposing monetary sanc-
tions on all involved, including the[ir] law firms .... In ad-
dition, he recommended requiring [one of the two], as a
"Rule 11 recidivist," to complete a legal ethics course spon-
sored by his local bar association.
There is no need to rehearse here the well-traversed
pose monetary sanctions upon the same was upheld on appeal. Midwest Motor
Sports, Inc., 347 F.3d 693, 700-01 (8th Cir. 2003). See also infra note 150 and
accompanying text.
For an overview of the federal common law of lawyering, see
MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 19, at ch. 807 (introduction to the
common law of lawyering; discussing the inherent power of the federal courts
to regulate the conduct of attorneys). For a discussion of the same in the con-
text of investigation and discovery in civil cases, see id. at ch. 809, and for a
discussion of the same in the context of Model Rule 4.2, see id. at ch. 810.
122. 264 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.R.I. 2003).
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ground of this litigation or the events that precipitated the
instant proceedings. Having reviewed the parties' memo-
randa and heard oral arguments, this [c]ourt without further
ado adopts the disposition recommended by the magistrate
judge, subject to the following revisions. The magistrate
judge recommended that the sanctioned parties be required
to pay [the] [p]laintiff's attorneys' fees jointly; it is more
accurate to say that they are jointly and severally liable for
those payments. Furthermore, requiring [the one attorney]
to complete an ethics course is unnecessary, as revocation
of his pro hac vice status and the imposition of sanctions
should serve Rule 1 's purpose of deterring similar conduct
in the future.
In conclusion, this [c]ourt hereby (1) revokes [the two at-
torneys'] pro hac vice status; (2) approves [another attor-
ney's] withdrawal from the case; and (3) orders [the defen-
dants' counsel and their law firms] to pay [the] [p]laintiff s
attorneys' fees in the amount of $31,331.25, for violating
Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Those individuals and law
firms are jointly and severally liable for those payments.1
23
The Obert decision is yet just another example of tying viola-
tions of the Model Rules to Civil Rule 11 violations.
D. Summary of Case Law Review
As shown by the above discussion, a few courts have used the
Model Rules to develop a standard by which to measure violations of
Civil Rule 11, even though the extent of their reliance has varied
from case to case. Given the overall paucity of such cases discussed
here, and given the huge number of Civil Rule 11 cases, it is hard to
say that these courts have actually established a standard that other
courts will follow; but these courts have certainly shown the way,
just as the Golden Eagle rehearing en banc dissent did.'
24
What is surprising, however, is that none of these cases, except
for Golden Eagle, have given any reason why the litigation ethics
123. Id. at 110-12 (citations and footnote omitted).
124. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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rules have not been used as the standard in the over 8,000 Civil Rule
11 cases to date, and the reason given for not using them in Golden
Eagle is now obsolete.125 All that we know for a fact from the above
review is that the litigation ethics rules have not been used as the
Civil Rule 11 standard in over ninety-nine percent of the Civil Rule
11 cases.
V. CRITICISM OF USING CIVIL RULE 11 TO ENFORCE THE LITIGATION
ETHICS RULES VERSUS REFERRAL TO THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
In addition to the panel decision in the Golden Eagle case,
126
there has been some intermittent criticism about using Civil Rule 11
to enforce litigation ethics rules, not to mention professionalism,
127
the decline of which seems to be a never ending lament of the bar.
128
As pointed out by Professor McMorrow, who has previously
noted the impact that Civil Rule 11 has had on federalizing litigation
ethics rules, 129 there are dangers to such federalization as well, to
wit:
A clear and national vision of the lawyer's ethical duties
may well help the legal profession better define its role in
125. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
127. See Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and
Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 366 (1989) ("Neither professionalism nor civil-
ity will, in our opinion, be served by encouraging such motions except where a
lawyer's conduct has been willful or irresponsible.").
128. Id. at 365-66 ("Another product of the sanctions explosion is the ero-
sion of civility. This is somewhat ironic since the incivility engendered by liti-
gation abuses was a contributing cause of the 1983 rule amendments. We re-
member when civility and mutual respect were more characteristic of relations
between trial adversaries than they are today, when most litigators did not view
a decent working relationship with an opponent as a personal weakness or be-
trayal of a client."). See also Thomas F. Maffei, Rule 11-The Wrong Ap-
proach to Professionalism in Civil Litigation, 73 MASS. L. REV. 98, 98-99
(1988) (arguing that guidelines of professional courtesy and various bar asso-
ciations' efforts on promoting professionalism may be the better answer to the
problem that Civil Rule 11 was meant to resolve); see generally SECTION OF
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONs TO THE BAR, A.B.A., REPORT OF THE
PROFESSIONALISM COMMITrEE: TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM
§ I(B) (1996) (discussing the decline in professionalism and describing the
prevalent themes among various commentators on the problem).
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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the adversary process. The impact of Rule 11 is at least
getting lawyers to talk about central issues of their role in
the adversary system-if only to complain about it. A na-
tional standard, however, is not without cost. The potential
dangers of having a dominant vision of competence derived
from the federal judiciary are threefold. First, judges differ
from lawyers in their evaluation of lawyer conduct. Sec-
ond, this vision of lawyering is being made by federal
judges who may come from different backgrounds and ex-
perience than the bar in general or the general public. Fi-
nally, and related to these first two points, the judicial proc-
ess may not be well suited for creating a community of
interest.130
From another angle, Professor William I. Weston has argued
that, although Model Rule 3.1 varies slightly from the 1983 version
of Civil Rule 11, the "use of the established grievance procedure en-
hances the profession and maintains the balance between the attorney
and the court.' 131 Moreover, he has argued that Civil Rule 11 unnec-
essarily "duplicate[s] the traditional attorney discipline procedures.
These procedures take into account the interests of all participants in
the legal system. ... Utilization of court-ordered sanctions dimin-
ishes the value and credibility of the grievance process."'
132
In contrast, Professors Stephen R. Ripps and John N. Drowatzky
have argued that "the federal district courts are usurping the function
of the bar association and disciplinary processes [only] when no local
court rules refer substantial Rule 11 violations to these bodies.' 33 In
conducting their study on Civil Rule 11, they noted that:
Judges reported violations to bar association disciplinary
committees a small percent of the time, and they reported
that no local rule required them to do so. Further, a large
130. MeMorrow, supra note 19, at 981.
131. William I. Weston, Court-Ordered Sanctions of Attorneys: A Concept
that Duplicates the Role of Attorney Disciplinary Procedures, 94 DICK. L.
REv. 897, 925 (1990).
132. Id. at 927-28.
133. Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Federal Rule 11: Are the
Federal District Courts Usurping the Disciplinary Function of the Bar?, 32
VAL. U. L. REv. 67, 69 (1997).
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majority of the judges and bar associations [surveyed] did
not expect all violations to be reported. ... In addition, the
judges were more likely than bar associations to view viola-
tions of Rule 11 as a small problem.
34
Likewise, Professor Jeffrey A. Parness has argued that:
Disciplinary referrals should be guided by the principles
that serious professional misconduct by attorneys during
federal civil litigation is best left to traditional state disci-
plinary agencies, and that less serious misconduct is best
handled by the trial judge presiding in the relevant civil
case. The distinction between serious and less serious mis-
conduct is difficult to draw, yet should normally be based
on the reporting duties for judges and lawyers in the state in
which the misconduct occurred. As noted earlier, the dis-
tinction drawn in the American Bar Association's model
codes involves conduct violative of professional norms
"that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness." Violations raising such
substantial questions are better left to state agencies, as fed-
eral courts typically defer to state authority on the standards
for competent legal practice. The internal disciplinary bod-
ies of federal district courts, where they exist, simply do not
have the expertise and experience, and perhaps resources,
of traditional state agencies.
35
Whereas Professor Lonnie T. Brown, Jr. has argued that all Civil
Rule 11 motions should be reported, because:
Although Rule 11 protects lawyers only from sanctions
within federal trial courts, it has the effect of creating a
much broader zone of protection because there is an unde-
niable link between Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.1. When
there has been a violation of Rule 11, there will almost cer-
tainly have been a violation of Model Rule 3.1, as well as
Model Rules 3.2, 3.4(c), and 8.4(d), irrespective of whether
or not Rule 11 sanctions are ultimately imposed. Specifi-
134. Id. at 88.
135. Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil
Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. REV. 37, 59-60 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
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cally, at the moment when an attorney determines that there
has been a violation of Rule 11 and decides to prepare and
serve the requisite "notice" motion on opposing counsel,
that lawyer will also necessarily have determined that there
was a violation of Model Rule 3.1, among others, as well.
Moreover, it goes without saying that such a determination
meets the "knowledge" requirement of Model Rule 8.3(a)
no matter what level of knowledge is deemed appropriate.
Thus, the duty to report is activated.
136
Professor Brown's idea was first championed by Professor Vic-
tor H. Kramer, who noted that:
To maximize the deterrent effect of Rule 11 sanctions,
courts should ensure that the identity of sanctioned lawyers
is a matter of public record, and should routinely report im-
position of sanctions on lawyers to the state bar disciplinary
bodies of the fifty states. Unfortunately, district courts
sometimes impose sanctions without filing published opin-
ions, and appellate court opinions all too often fail to make
clear whether the district court imposed the sanction on the
client, the client's lawyer, or both. As a result, it is impos-
sible to know on whom the court imposed a sanction, at
least without going to the record in the district clerk's of-
fice. Although a reviewing court may be understandably
reluctant to publicize the name of a sanctioned attorney
when the lower court improperly imposed the sanction, it is
difficult to justify anonymity when the appellate court af-
136. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating
Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1555, 1604-05 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Brown has advocated mandatory reporting of all Civil Rule
11 motions, which would then be entered into some sort of a national database,
so that patterns of such violations could be spotted for future use by the courts
and the disciplinary system. See id. at 1606-16.
The ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability runs
the National Legal Malpractice Data Center ("NLMDC"), and that would be
one possible database repository, if the federal courts did not wish to create
their own. For more information on the NLMDC, see American Bar Associa-
tion Standing Committee on Lawyer's Professional liability at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/lpl (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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firms the sanction. As noted above, the adverse publicity to
a sanctioned lawyer can be an important part of the deter-
rent effect of sanctions. If the public is not made aware of
the discipline, the professional ignominy of having been
sanctioned or otherwise disciplined is far less intense.
Once a court has imposed a sanction on an attorney, it is
difficult to justify not reporting the sanction to the discipli-
nary body of the jurisdiction which has authorized the sanc-
tioned attorney to engage in the practice of law. Reporting
of Rule 11 sanctions will give state disciplinary authorities
an opportunity to review the records of attorneys who pre-
viously had violated the state's code of professional respon-
sibility in light of their Rule 11 violations. Regular report-
ing of all Rule 11 sanctions to state disciplinary authorities
also would disclose multiple Rule 11 sanctions against the
same lawyer. To effectively use this information, state dis-
ciplinary bodies should investigate every lawyer who has
received more than one Rule 11 sanction. Reporting by
federal district clerks to state authorities would make this
salutary practice possible.1
37
The Eight Circuit explained the proper response to this type of
criticism in Harlan v. Lewis, 13 where, in upholding inherent power
sanctions against the defendant's attorney for having violated Model
Rule 3.4, it stated that:
[The defendant's counsel] next argues that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions instead of
referring [the defense counsel's] conduct to state discipli-
nary authorities. [He] asserts that "[t]he business of the
court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a general
overseer of the ethics of those who practice [before it]
137. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional
Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REv. 793, 808-09 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
For an overview of the current status of the misconduct reporting rule,
see Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Note, A Current Look at Model Rule
8.3, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 747 (2003).
138. 982 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993), modified, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3403
(8th Cir. Feb. 26, 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Harlan, 510 U.S. 828
(1993).
896 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:819
unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause
before it." [He] also argues that "[w]here there is no threat
to the integrity offurther proceedings, possible ethical vio-
lations which 'surfac[e] during the litigation are generally
better addressed by the comprehensive machinery of the
state and federal bar."'
We entertain no doubt that the district judge was author-
ized to preserve the integrity of the proceedings before him
by imposing sanctions. The questioned behavior tainted the
trial of the cause and threatened the integrity of further pro-
ceedings. The district judge saw [the defense counsel's]
misconduct as having a significant negative effect on both
the discovery process and the eventual trial. A district
judge must have the power to deal with conduct of attor-
neys in litigation without delegating this responsibility to
state disciplinary mechanisms. State disciplinary authori-
ties may act in such cases if they choose, but this does not
limit the power or responsibility. of the district court. In ad-
dition, the state disciplinary body could not have repaired
the damage [that the defense counsel] caused by attempting
to restrict the flow of relevant information and discovery
and by planting implied threats in the minds of potential
witnesses. Under these circumstances, the district court
was correct in resolving both the disciplinary and remedial
questions in a single action.
139
Thus, the Harlan court cut to the bottom line, which is that, as a
practical matter, referral to the applicable bar association or state dis-
ciplinary authority for misconduct in a pending case is ineffective at
solving the problem in the pending case, itself. For this reason, try-
ing to argue that the federal courts should not have jurisdiction to en-
force the litigation ethics rules for violations thereof during litigation
is like trying to push the proverbial boulder uphill, because the over-
139. Id. at 1260-61 (some alterations inoriginal; citations omitted).
Winter 2004] INTEGRATING LE&PR WITH RULE 11
all historical and political reasons for having granted the federal
courts this power in the first place have not diminished.
40
Moreover, "[t]he ethical prohibitions against nonmeritorious
claims and defenses overlap a great deal with court rules and statutes
that authorize monetary or other sanctions for unnecessary or
groundless litigation. Court-imposed sanctions for frivolous litiga-
tion and professional discipline for the same misbehavior are not mu-
tually exclusive,' ' 41 and referral to the disciplinary system is one of
the recommended sanctions for a Civil Rule 11 violation.
142
In fact, as Professor Kramer has argued:
To help resolve these inconsistencies,... courts should
consider and interpret Rule 11 primarily as a tool to enforce
the Rules of Professional Conduct in litigation rather than
as a means to compensate litigants who become the victims
of unprofessional conduct: deterrence rather than reim-
bursement should be the primary purpose of sanctioning
lawyers. For many years, state rules have made it unethical
for lawyers to file suits or take other action in litigation that
is legally insupportable or designed to harass the opposing
side. The state lawyer-disciplinary bodies, however, have
failed to enforce these provisions. Rule 11 thus offers the
federal courts an opportunity to enforce professional re-
sponsibility rules that state disciplinary bodies have been
unable or unwilling to enforce. To the extent that federal
courts interpret Rule 11 as a device to enforce these Rules,
the circuits should resolve much of their disagreement. 1
43
So the criticism that should have been advanced here is the fol-
lowing: Why isn't the standard for violating Civil Rule 11 that
which is encompassed within the Model Rules, and why hasn't the
140. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 1.08[f] (discussing continuing attempts,
sometimes successful, to return some areas of the law to the mandatory sanc-
tions environment of the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11).
141. LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 61:117 (ABA/BNA) (1999).
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993). See generally
VAIRO, supra note 16, § 9.03[b][2][B] (discussing disciplinary action as being
one of the non-monetary sanctions available under the current version of Civil
Rule 11).
143. Kramer, supra note 137, at 797-98 (footnotes omitted).
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Civil Rule 11 sanction process been officially incorporated into the
overall attorney disciplinary process?
These questions are important, because as explained by Profes-
sor Peter A. Joy in his recent study, the Civil Rule 11 sanctioning
process has sub silentio taken the place of the disciplinary process
for violations of these litigation ethics rules; specifically, during the
last decade of over 2,000 Civil Rule 11 cases, only four of these have
resulted in referral of the attorney to the disciplinary system, 44 even
though some 274 of these cases resulted in some form of Civil Rule
11 sanctions against attorneys at the district court level.145 More-
over, of these 274 lawyers, only twenty-two were publicly disci-
plined after their Civil Rule 11 violations had occurred; and of these
twenty-two, only three were ultimately disciplined in connection
with their Civil Rule 11 violations.
146
In discussing the institutional choices underlying the relation-
ship between Civil Rule 11 sanctions and professional discipline,
Professor Joy explained that:
The empirical analysis demonstrating a negligible correla-
tion between the Rule 11 sanctions and reported lawyer
discipline for that same conduct suggests a number of
institutional choices underlying the relationship between
Rule 11 sanctions and disciplinary enforcement of ethics
violations for Rule 11 conduct. The empirical analysis
points to an implicit division of authority concerning the
regulation of lawyer litigation conduct in federal courts. In
this division of authority, federal district court judges wield
primary control over the litigation conduct of lawyers
appearing before them. Structural features of both Rule 11
and prevailing ethics rules, both of which do not require
either judges or lawyers to report Rule 11 violations to
lawyer disciplinary authorities, reinforce this division of
authority by virtually guaranteeing that in most instances
the Rule 11 sanctions will be the only public sanctions
imposed on lawyers for their litigation conduct.
144. Joy, supra note 58, at 792.
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id. at 796.
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In addition to the structural features of Rule 11 and the
ethics rules, which do not require either referrals to or
reporting of Rule 11 sanctions, there are at least four
additional institutional choices that underlie the primacy of
federal judges in controlling litigation conduct before them:
first and foremost, lawyer discipline agencies are unable or
unwilling to control litigation conduct; second, the legal
profession has determined that trial judges are more
effective in controlling litigation conduct in pending
matters; third, prevailing standards for enforcing lawyer
discipline and standards for imposing lawyer sanctions
downplay imposing public sanctions for litigation conduct;
and fourth, the legal profession's failure to coordinate
federal courts' actions with and state lawyer disciplinary
agencies contributes to vesting federal judges with the
primary responsibility for enforcing norms of acceptable
lawyer litigation conduct in bringing lawsuits and making
other court filings.
147
So what we know from the above discussion is that even though
some commentators have argued for Civil Rule 11 violations to be
reported to the bar, this has not occurred. The bar has not generally
disciplined lawyers who have violated Civil Rule 11, and thus the
only de facto enforcement of the litigation ethics rules has come
from the courts. As such, if we are going to use Civil Rule 11 to en-
force the litigation ethics rules, shouldn't we at least acknowledge
this fact and measure an attorney's conduct by these litigation ethics
rules?
VI. WHY HAVE THE LITIGATION ETHICS RULES GENERALLY BEEN
SEPARATED FROM CIVIL RULE 11 ANALYSIS?
In the original Scope of the Model Rules, the ABA stated that
the:
[18] Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of
action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty
has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulat-
147. Id. at 806-07 (footnotes omitted).
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ing conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not de-
signed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the
purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are in-
voked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or
for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a dis-
ciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek en-
forcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of
lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating
such a duty.
148
During the drafting of this provision of the original Model
Rules, this paragraph was "intended to make clear that the purpose of
the Model Rules was to regulate lawyer conduct through the discipli-
nary process, not to serve as a basis for civil liability."'
49
However, as Professor Ronald D. Rotunda has observed:
[T]his determination that the ethics rules should not be used
in malpractice cases or in disqualification motions may be
likened to whistling past the graveyard. If one is concerned
when crossing a graveyard at night, it does no harm to
whistle, but the whistling provides no real protection either.
In spite of the protestations in the Scope section, courts
have often used the legal ethics rules to impose tort liability
on lawyers[,] to reverse criminal prosecutions, and to dis-
qualify lawyers. As one court acknowledged, it is "com-
mon lore that the Code, though it literally prescribes only
the bases of lawyer discipline, is regularly used by courts to
establish the criteria for lawyer disqualification as well."' 5
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 18 (1983).
149. MODEL RULES HIsTORY, supra note 4, at 15 (comments of the reporter,
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.).
150. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-8.2.3, at 41 (footnotes omitted). See also
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at 5 ("The disclaimers notwith-
standing, courts have long looked to the Rules as the standards of ethical con-
duct in myriad contexts, particularly contract and tort actions against lawyers,
disqualification motions, and fee disputes."); see generally 1 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 44, § 4.1 (discussing the relationship between the law of
legal malpractice and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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The 2002 amendments to the Model Rules changed the Scope as
follows:
M--8-1 [201 Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to
a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any
presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been
breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not neces-
sarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as
disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The
Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to
provide a structure for regulating conduct through discipli-
nary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be sub-
verted when they are invoked by opposing parties as proce-
dural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a
lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under
the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not im-
ply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transac-
tion has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Aeeer4
ingly, nothing int the Rules should be deemed to augmen
any substantive legal duty of layfers or the extrFa
disiplinary c.nsequenes of violating such a duty. Never-
theless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by
lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of
breach of the applicable standard of conduct.
151
So what has changed?
Two important sentences were added to the Scope section
in 2002 to "reflect the decisions of courts on the relation-
ship between these Rules and causes of action against a
lawyer, including the admissibility of evidence of violation
of a Rule in appropriate cases." ABA Report to the House
of Delegates, No. 401 (Aug. 2001), Scope, Reporter's Ex-
planation of Changes.
The most important change is the concession in paragraph
As Professor Rotunda has noted, the Model Rules are commonly used
in criminal cases, disqualification motions, fee disputes, and legal malpractice
cases. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-8.2.3.
151. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Supplement at 3-4.
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[20] that "since the Rules do establish standards of conduct
by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence
of a breach of the applicable standard of conduct." This
amendment reflects the position reached by a majority of
courts. The Restatement takes a similar position. Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52(2) & cmt.
f (2000) (Rule violation "may be considered by a trier of
fact as an aid in understanding and applying" the duties of
competence and diligence required to meet the standard of
care).
Balancing this is the new sentence in paragraph [20] that
notes that "violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant
any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification
of a lawyer in pending litigation."'
5 2
So even today, the ABA has stubbornly refused to acknowledge
or "sanction" the use of the Model Rules as the standard for Civil
Rule 11 or any other motion practice, apparently because "the pur-
pose of the [Model] Rules can be subverted when they are invoked
by opposing parties as procedural weapons."'15 3 However, the ABA
has never explained or justified this position, which seems patently
hypocritical. Moreover, as discussed by Professor Rotunda,154 the
courts have used the Model Rules in a variety of litigation contexts
anyway.
155
To some extent, the American Law Institute ("ALI") has con-
tributed to this problem by respecting the ABA's turf, so-to-speak.
As explained by Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William
Hodes, "[a]lthough the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
has a different organization from that of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct,... and is directly applicable only outside of the dis-
ciplinary process, it perforce covers almost all of the same
ground."'156 Thus, the ALI has attempted by its relatively new Re-
152. Id. at 5.
153. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 20 (2003).
154. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
155. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-8.2.3.
156. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 44, § 26.5 (cross-reference deleted).
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statement' 57 to carve out the non-disciplinary arena as its own do-
main, leaving the disciplinary arena to the ABA; yet this is a false
demarcation, and it is too late to try to implement this now. 8 Of in-
terest, Professor Hazard was the reporter for the 1983 Model
Rules, 159 and he was the director of the ALI from 1984 to 1999.160
In the context of frivolous litigation, the ALI's Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers has attempted to define at
least a portion of the law relating to Civil Rule 11 as follows:
§ 110. Frivolous Advocacy
(1) A lawyer may not bring or defend a proceeding
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good-faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding or the respondent in
a proceeding that could result in incarceration may so
defend the proceeding as to require that the prosecutor
establish every necessary element.
(3) A lawyer may not make a frivolous discovery re-
quest, fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to com-
ply with a proper discovery request of another party, or
intentionally fail otherwise to comply with applicable
157. The Restatement was begun in 1986, but it was not substantively ap-
proved until 1998. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS foreword (2000); see also ROTUNDA, supra note 45, §§ 1-3.1, 1-4.4
(brief historical discussion of this Restatement; noting that the official draft
was not finalized until 2000 for minor and stylistic reasons).
158. See ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-4 (gauging the influence of this Re-
statement).
159. E.g., CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A.B.A., THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5 (1987) ("Professor Geof-
frey C. Hazard, Jr., Reporter of the Commission, often introduced the proposed
Rules and presented the rationale of each.").
160. University of Pennsylvania Law School Faculty, Geoffrey C. Hazard
Jr., at http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/ghazard/cv.pdf (last visited Oct. 25,
2003).
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procedural requirements concerning discovery.
161
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110
(2000).
The comments and illustrations to this section are as follows:
Comment[s]:
a. Scope and cross-references. Subsection (1) states the rule of
professional codes requiring that a lawyer have a nonfrivolous basis
for steps taken in advocacy for a client. On procedural rules found in
most jurisdictions that impose a more exacting requirement, see
Comment c. Subsection (2) states the more permissive requirement
for advocacy in criminal-defense representations. On the require-
ments that a lawyer not misrepresent the law to a tribunal and that a
lawyer cite controlling authority, see § 111. Several Sections in Topic
4 state additional duties in an advocate's dealings with witnesses and
evidence. See also § 106 (prohibition against harassing third persons).
b. Rationale. Frivolous advocacy inflicts distress, wastes time, and
causes increased expense to the tribunal and adversaries and may
achieve results for a client that are unjust. Nonetheless, disciplinary
enforcement against frivolous litigation is rare. Most bar disciplinary
agencies rely on the courts in which litigation occurs to deal with
abuse. Tribunals usually sanction only extreme abuse. Administra-
tion and interpretation of prohibitions against frivolous litigation
should be tempered by concern to avoid overenforcement.
c. Procedural sanction against unfounded assertions in litigation.
Procedural rules modeled on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure impose affirmative obligations going beyond a requirement
of minimally plausible position. In addition, courts have inherent
power to impose sanctions against frivolous or otherwise abusive liti-
gation tactics (see generally § 1, Comment b).
Such procedural rules generally have four elements, although juris-
dictions differ on particulars. First, a lawyer may file a pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper only after making an inquiry about facts and law
that is reasonable in the circumstances. Second, the lawyer's conclu-
sions as to the facts and law must meet an objective, minimal standard
of supportability. Third, litigation measures may not be taken for an
improper purpose, even in instances in which they are otherwise
minimally supportable. Finally, remedies provided for violations may
include sanctions such as fee shifting, which in appropriate cases may
be imposed directly on an offending lawyer (see Comment g).
Federal Rule 11 and corresponding state procedural rules generally
are applicable only to positions asserted in writings signed by a law-
yer, such as a pleading or motion. Other sources of law may extend a
court's power to other activities of an advocate. For example, in the
federal system, § 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code prohibits
actions of a lawyer, not limited to writings, that unduly multiply pro-
ceedings. A similar authority is conferred on federal appellate courts
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under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. Many courts also rec-
ognize a residual inherent power to impose sanctions on lawyers for
bad-faith litigation. Detailed consideration of Federal Rule 11 and
similar procedural rules is beyond the scope of this Restatement.
d. Frivolous positions in litigation. A frivolous position is one that
a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in
merit that there is no substantial possibility that the tribunal would ac-
cept it. A nonfrivolous argument includes a good-faith argument for
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Whether good
faith exists depends on such factors as whether the lawyer in question
or another lawyer established a precedent adverse to the position being
argued (and, if so, whether the lawyer disclosed that precedent),
whether new legal grounds of plausible weight can be advanced,
whether new or additional authority supports the lawyer's position, or
whether for other reasons, such as a change in the composition of a
multi-member court, arguments can be advanced that have a substan-
tially greater chance of success.
Illustrations:
1. The supreme court of a jurisdiction held 10 years ago that
only the state legislature could set aside the employment-at-will
rule of the state's common law. In a subsequent decision, the
same court again referred to the employment-at-will doctrine, stat-
ing that "whatever the justice or defects of that rule, we feel pres-
ently bound to continue to follow it." In the time since the subse-
quent decision, the employment-at-will doctrine has been
extensively discussed, often critically, in the legal literature, and
courts in some jurisdictions have overturned or limited the older
decisions. Lawyer now represents an employee at will. Notwith-
standing the earlier rulings of the state supreme court, intervening
events indicate that a candid attempt to obtain reversal of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine is a nonfrivolous legal position in the
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the state supreme court had
unanimously reaffirmed the doctrine in recent months, the action
would be frivolous in the absence of reason to believe that there is
a substantial possibility that, notwithstanding the recent adverse
precedent, the court would reconsider altering its stance.
2. Following unsuccessful litigation in a state court, Lawyer,
representing the unsuccessful Claimant in the state-court litiga-
tion, filed an action in federal court seeking damages under a fed-
eral civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the state-court
trial judge, alleging that the judge had denied due process to
Claimant in rulings made in the state-court action. The complaint
was evidently based on the legal position that the doctrine of ab-
solute judicial immunity should not apply to a case in which a
judge has made an egregious error. Although some scholars have
criticized the rule, the law is and continues to be well settled that
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absolute judicial immunity under § 1983 extends to such errors
and precludes an action such as that asserted by Claimant. No in-
tervening legal event suggests that any federal court would alter
that interpretation. Given the absence of any basis for believing
that a substantial possibility exists that an argument against the
immunity would be accepted in a federal court, the claim is frivo-
lous.
It may be reasonably doubtful to a lawyer whether existing
precedent supports a legal position or whether the lawyer should
instead ask a court to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
When an advocate has adequately referred to the relevant author-
ity (see § 111) the rule of this Section is not violated if the lawyer
argues that existing precedent supports a legal position even
though the tribunal concludes that the argument should more ap-
propriately have been couched as an effort to modify existing law.
In any event, a lawyer may not make a false statement of a mate-
rial proposition of law to the tribunal (see § 111(1)).
e. Abusive discovery practice. As stated in Subsection (3), a law-
yer may not, in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request
or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a proper dis-
covery request of another party. Frivolousness is determined under
the standard stated in Comment d. Whether a lawyer complying with
a discovery request has made a reasonably diligent effort is deter-
mined by an objective standard. In any response, the Section permits
a lawyer to assert on behalf of the client any nonfrivolous basis for
noncompliance. A lawyer must not, for example, delay a discovery
response beyond the time permitted by law without adequate justifica-
tion, provide answers to discovery requests that the lawyer knows to
be false and misleading, or knowingly withhold discoverable informa-
tion in responding to proper requests for such material. Procedural
rules (see generally Comment c) may impose more stringent standards
for making or responding to discovery requests.
f Advocacy in a criminal-defense representation. The rules in this
Section apply generally to criminal-defense lawyers. However, as
stated in Subsection (2), a lawyer defending a person accused of
crime, even if convinced that the guilt of the offense charged can be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, may require the prosecution to
prove every element of the offense, including those facts as to which
the lawyer knows the accused can present no effective defense. A
criminal-defense lawyer may take any step required or permitted by
the constitutional guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel.
With respect to propositions of law, a criminal-defense lawyer may
make any nonfrivolous argument. Under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, a lawyer representing a convicted person on
appeal may be required to file a so-called Anders brief in the event the
lawyer concludes that there is no nonfrivolous ground on which the
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In addition, the ALI has devoted an entire chapter of this Re-
statement to advocacy in general, 162 limits on advocacy, 163 advocates
and tribunals,164 and advocates and evidence,165 all of which is corn-
appeal can be maintained.
g. Remedies. This Section restates requirements of the lawyer
codes, violations of which are sanctioned through professional disci-
pline. Many jurisdictions by legislation or rule provide for fee shifting
as a sanction for frivolous advocacy, including sanctions against an
advocate, a party, or both and often under standards stricter than those
stated in the Section (see Comment c). In relatively rare instances,
damages may be recovered in an independent action (see generally
§ 57, Comments d & e). Under some legislation or rules, an offending
lawyer may be fined, reprimanded, otherwise sanctioned, or referred
to a disciplinary agency.
Courts generally attempt to impose sanctions for unwarranted liti-
gation on the lawyer or client (see § 29, Comment d) in proportion to
their relative responsibility. In appropriate circumstances, when a
sanction is focused upon a lawyer for deterrence purposes, a tribunal
may order that the lawyer not seek reimbursement from a client. Al-
locating responsibility may be difficult. Achieving precise allocation
may entail inquiry into matters that are generally protected by the at-
torney-client privilege (see § 68 and following) or the work-product
immunity (see § 87 and following). In addition, such an inquiry may
interject conflicts of interest between lawyer and client with respect to
the burdens of the sanction (see Comment b). Particularly when the
representation is not at an end and the relative fault of lawyer and cli-
ent is doubtful, the preferable approach is to leave questions of ulti-
mate responsibility between them to resolution after the proceedings
are concluded.
Id. cmts. a-g.
For a discussion of the interrelationship between Restatement section
110 and Civil Rule 11, see ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 22-2.4 (discussing the
basic elements of the procedural rules against frivolous litigation).
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 105-
109 (2000) (covering complying with the law and tribunal rulings, dealing with
other participants in proceedings, prohibited forensic tactics, advocate as wit-
ness, and advocate's public comment on pending litigation).
163. Id. §§ 110-112 (covering frivolous advocacy, disclosure of legal au-
thority, and advocacy in exparte and other proceedings).
164. Id. §§ 113-115 (covering improperly influencing a judicial officer,
lawyer's statement concerning a judicial officer, and lawyer contact with a ju-
ror).
165. Id. §§ 116-120 (covering interviewing and preparing a prospective wit-
ness, compensating a witness, falsifying or destroying evidence, physical evi-
dence of a crime, and false testimony as evidence).
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parable to the complete litigation ethics rules contained in the Model
Rules.
166
According to Professor Rotunda, "[w]hile the... Model Rules
greatly influence courts in adopting rules of ethics, the purpose of the
ALI's Restatement is to influence courts in interpreting those ethics
rules as well as other law governing lawyers and the practice of
law."
167
So why have the federal courts ignored the Model Rules here,
when they have adopted them as the national standard for other ethi-
cal areas such as disqualification motions? 168 Certainly, the ABA's
attempt to keep these rules out of the litigation context must have had
some impact coupled with the ALI's willingness to take over the
role, its fourteen year delay from 1986 to 2000 in producing this Re-
statement, and the resulting "newness" of the same. In other words,
to the extent that the ALI could have filled this void for the federal
courts, its Restatement was unavailable to the courts during the ma-
jority of the time period in which the Civil Rule 11 jurisprudence
was being created.
Another explanation is that since there is no rule of civil proce-
dure for disqualification, fee disputes, legal malpractice, etc., the
courts were forced to turn somewhere for guidance, when consider-
ing those issues. However, since Civil Rule 11 is, in fact, a rule of
civil procedure, the federal courts have gotten stuck with their blind-
ers on looking at the rule for substance, when the rule, by category, is
166. See supra Part II.
167. See ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-3.1.
168. See, e.g., Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir.
1994) (Model Rules reflect the "national standard" for disqualification mo-
tions); see generally RICHARD E. FLAMM, LAWYER DISQUALIFICATION:
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND OTHER BASES § 2.2, at 28 (2003) ("It is gener-
ally agreed that courts have the inherent authority to disqualify counsel for vio-
lating any ethical rule-not just conflict of interest rules-and other types of
ethical misconduct may justify invoking this remedy in certain circumstances."
(footnotes omitted)); id. §§ 1.1-1.4 (discussing the rules governing lawyer
conduct, their purposes, their force and effect, and the consequences for violat-
ing them).
For a further discussion of the use of the litigation ethics rules in this
and other litigation areas, see ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-8.2.3 (noting that
the Model Rules are commonly used in criminal cases, disqualification mo-
tions, fee disputes, and legal malpractice cases).
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at least theoretically supposed to be one of procedure, i.e., "how" and
not "why" to sanction. This may be partly an historical accident, be-
cause when the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11 was being drafted,
Model Rule 3.1 and its related litigation ethics rules were also in the
drafting stage, and they both became effective within a day of each
other in August of 1983.169 Thus, because the drafters of the 1983
version of Civil Rule 11 were forced to create their own substantive
standards, once the rule became effective, the federal courts went
forward to create a federal common law of frivolous conduct without
stopping to consider that the analog litigation ethics rules might pro-
vide a more helpful starting place instead.170 In addition, since the
courts had traditionally avoided the litigation ethics rules when creat-
ing the common law relating to inherent power sanctions,171 they
were probably predisposed to follow this route in interpreting Civil
Rule 11, although recent inherent power cases have been centered
around the Model Rules.
172
Once the ball started rolling in the federal court arena, it never
really stopped, possibly for one of the reasons explained by Professor
McMorrow: that "Rule 11 may be... a method for federal judges
'to mold the bar in their own image."' 173 In addition, as described by
Professors McMorrow and Daniel R. Coquillette, the federal courts
have struggled since at least 1988 with how to regulate attorneys in
federal court, and they cannot even agree on what ethical standards
to use.174 However, there is a consensus that they do not want to du-
plicate the state disciplinary systems.
175
169. See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 44, § 27.3 (stating that the 1983
version of Civil Rule 11 became effective just one day before the adoption of
the Model Rules).
170. MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 19, § 807 (introduction to the
common law of lawyering).
171. Id. § 807.02[1] (discussing the fact that federal courts often give scant
attention to local rules addressing attorney conduct in the context of inherent
power sanctions).
172. E.g., Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 144 F. Supp.
2d 1147, 1159 (D.S.D. 2001) (exclusion of evidence sanction for violation of
Model Rule 4.2), afftd, 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003).
173. MCMORROW, supra note 19, at 975 (footnote omitted).
174. MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 19, §§ 802.20-.23 (describ-
ing and explaining current proposals for reform of the federal district court
rules systems). See also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court
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So, while the cause of this separation cannot be proven, the fac-
tors that contributed to this result appear to be: (1) the ABA's resis-
tance to the idea, (2) the ALI's desire to co-opt the area, (3) historical
accident, and (4) the self-interests of the federal courts.
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING SEPARATED THE LITIGATION ETHICS
RULES FROM CIVIL RULE 11
There are, and have been, multiple adverse consequences result-
ing from the separation of the litigation ethics rules from Civil Rule
11, and this separation has resulted in an avalanche of litigation and
uncertainty since the 1983 amendments to the rule, which then led, in
part, to the 1993 amendments to the same.176 This is true, in part,
because the litigation ethics rules define or regulate most, if not all,
of the circumstances falling within the purview of Civil Rule 11.
However, a multitude of issues within the purview of the litigation
ethics rules are not defined or regulated by Civil Rule 11. In other
words, Civil Rule 11 is under-inclusive in terms of regulating attor-
ney litigation conduct. This is true even when Civil Rules 26 and 37
are taken into account in regards to discovery sanctions.
For instance, years of litigation were spent on the issue of the
overall purpose of Civil Rule 11, with the debate being one of pen-
alty versus deterrence versus compensation. 177 This debate, how-
Authority to Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56
VANDERBILT L. REv. 1303, 1318-36 (2003) (discussing alternative visions of
federal judicial regulation).
Professors McMorrow & Coquillette have noted that one of the argu-
ments against adopting the Model Rules as the national standard is that they
are rarely cited in federal court, MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19,
§ 802.21[1], however, this Article proves that this reasoning is suspect, since
the majority of Civil Rule 11 cases do not mention the litigation ethics rules,
even though these rules are applicable to such cases. See supra notes 55-64
and accompanying text. Thus looking at the number of federal cases citing the
Model Rules tells us nothing about the number of cases that have dealt with
issues within the purview of these rules.
175. Id. § 802.22[1], at 802-74 (discussing coordination with state discipli-
nary enforcement).
176. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 2.02 (discussing the Civil Rule 11 experi-
ence from 1983-1993).
177. See id. § 2.03[a] (discussing the purpose of the 1983 version of Civil
Rule 11).
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ever, was not completely resolved until the 1993 amendments made
clear that the primary purpose of the rule was to deter frivolous con-
duct and not to penalize attorneys or to compensate victims. 178 Even
so, a decade of litigation and revision could have been avoided had
the discussion been framed by the Model Rules, which were de-
signed to regulate attorney conduct and not to compensate victims of
misconduct.
1 79
Another example is the issue of the "Paper as a Whole" Doc-
trine, 180 which, as discussed above in regards to the Golden Eagle
case, 18 was not totally abandoned until 1992.82 Had Model Rule
3.1 set the standard, this debate never would have occurred, because
that rule now commands that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law."' 183 This is true, because during the entire timeframe
that the courts were declining to sanction unless the entire paper was
frivolous, any frivolous issue contained in that paper still violated
Model Rule 3.1 and thus constituted misconduct.
84
There is another obvious problem that could have been avoided.
While the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11 applied only to signed writ-
ings,' 85 Model Rule 3.1 does not require a signing, and it does not on
its face even require a paper. So, oral statements are already implic-
itly covered by Model Rule 3.1,186 and they are explicitly covered by
Model Rule 3.3187 But it took until the 1993 amendments to Civil
Rule 11, and the addition of the prohibition of "later advocating," to
178. See id. § 2.04[a] (discussing the purpose of the 1993 amendments to
Civil Rule 11).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 18 (1983).
180. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 4.01[e] (discussing the "Paper as a Whole"
controversy).
181. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
182. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991)
(en banc).
183. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003).
184. Id. R. 8.4(a).
185. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 4.02[a] (discussing the signing require-
ment).
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003).
187. Id. R. 3.3.
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outlaw frivolous oral statements to some extent.' 88  So, in other
words, much effort was spent to incorporate this provision into Civil
Rule 11, when this prohibition already existed in Model Rules 3.1
and 3.3. It is unfathomable why so much time and effort was spent
to outlaw conduct that was already outlawed and then to turn around
and act like this was something new as reflected in the 1993 amend-
ments to Civil Rule 11.189
Even worse, the "later advocating" provision in the 1993
amendments did not fully implement the duty of candor, which was
part of the reason for the amendments. 190 Under the 1983 version of
Civil Rule 11, frivolousness was judged at the time of filing, and
there was no duty to update the paper, if it later became frivolous.
191
The 1993 version attempted to solve this problem by making the
triggering event the "later advocating" of a position that had by then
become frivolous. 192 Had the standard been Model Rule 3.3, there
would have been a continuous duty of candor, 193 which would have
obviated this entire discussion.
Moreover, even now the "later advocating" provision is insuffi-
cient in a variety of circumstances. For example, assume that one of
the parties in a lawsuit files a motion for partial summary judgment,
which is granted, but the remainder of the case goes to trial. Assume
that the law changes between the granting of the partial summary
judgment motion and trial, and that this change would compel the
vacation of the partial summary judgment on a motion for reconsid-
eration. Further assume that the benefited party is aware of this
change but does not report it, and that the detrimented party remains
unaware. In this case, there is no Civil Rule 11 liability for the bene-
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). See also VAiRO, supra note 16, § 4.02[d][2] (dis-
cussing oral assertions under the 1993 amendments to Civil Rule 11 and the
concept of "later advocating").
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
190. Id.
191. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 5.04 (discussing the continuing duty theory
under the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11 and "later advocating" under the 1993
version).
192. See id. § 5.04[b] (discussing "later advocating" under the 1993 version
of Civil Rule 11).
193. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) ("The duties stated
[herein] continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if com-
pliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.").
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fited party, because there has been no "later advocating," since the
issue has already been decided. In contrast, under Model Rule 3.3,
there is a continuing duty of candor,194 which would require the at-
torneys to notify the court of a change in controlling law until the
end of the case.
Thus, Civil Rule 11 fails its purpose here, because it still looks
only to positive action ("later advocating") rather than the failure to
act (continuing duty of candor). Keep in mind that the attorney has
still committed an ethical violation under Model Rule 3.3. The court,
however, just cannot sanction him or her under Civil Rule 11. If the
purpose of Civil Rule 11 is to deter only frivolous conduct as defined
by positive action, this distinction may make sense; but if the pur-
pose of the rule is to enforce the litigation ethics rules-which in-
cludes, but is not limited to, deterring frivolous conduct and all other
litigation ethics violations-then it does not, for the reasons ex-
plained above.
The examples go on and on. If Model Rule 3.1 would have been
used as the standard, then there would never have been any litigation
over whether or not Civil Rule 11 required an objective standard.' 95
If Model Rule 5.1 would have been used as the standard, there would
never have been any litigation as to whether or not non-signers of a
paper could be held liable for a Civil Rule 11 violation,196 and that
part of the 1993 amendments to Civil Rule 11 would have then be-
come unnecessary.
197
In short, the Model Rules already provided a ready-made road
map for the implementation of the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11, but
they were virtually ignored, 198 which resulted in a decade of litiga-
tion that culminated in the 1993 amendments. 99 Much of this would
have been unnecessary had Civil Rule 11 been seen as simply the
194. Id.
195. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 5.02[a] (discussing early confusion under
the 1983 amendments to Civil Rule 11 regarding the standard to be applied).
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5. 1(c) (defining conditions for
holding one lawyer liable for another's violation of the Model Rules).
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
198. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
199. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 2.02 (discussing the Civil Rule 11 experi-
ence from 1983-1993).
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procedural rule to implement the litigation ethics rules as champi-
oned by Professor Kramer.20 °
VIII. WHY SHOULD THE LITIGATION ETHICS RULES BECOME THE
CIVIL RULE 11 STANDARD?
Obviously, there are a number of reasons why the litigation eth-
ics rules should be the Civil Rule 11 standard, and it is not too late
for the courts to adopt this position, since the refinements evident in
the 1993 amendments follow the teachings of the Model Rules to a
large extent. 1
First, this separation has forced the federal courts to develop a
federal common law for frivolous conduct, which has taken up a
great amount of judicial resources, and which was unnecessary and
202redundant for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, this devel-
opment created many conflicts within the circuit courts, 203 who, ac-
cording to Professor Kramer, could have prevented or "resolve[d]
much of their disagreement," if they "[had] interpret[ed] [Civil] Rule
11 as a device to enforce the[] [Model] Rules .... "204
Second, this separation has created multiple codes of conduct
with which lawyers must comply, which is both confusing and some-
times contradictory.20 5 As explained by Professor McMorrow, this
should not be surprising, since the Civil Rule 11 jurisprudence was
built "largely through an adversarial model developed by federal
courts rather than through lawyers' self-developed standards or
through a process designed to have greater meaningful public in-
put.' '206 Moreover, as a practical matter, asking lawyers to learn
more than one ethical code of conduct is unrealistic, considering that
it is hard enough to get them to learn even one.
Third, this separation has resulted in some violations of litiga-
tion ethics being subject to Civil Rule 11 sanctions, yet other viola-
200. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
201. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), with su-
pra Part II.
202. See supra Part VII.
203. See, e.g., VAIRO, supra note 16, § 2.03[c][3] (discussing the unraveling
consensus under the 1983 version of Civil Rule 11).
204. Kramer, supra note 137, at 797-98 (footnotes omitted).
205. See supra Part VII.
206. McMorrow, supra note 19, at 975.
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tions not being subject to the rule.2°7 It makes no sense for the fed-
eral courts to regulate some, but not all, litigation ethics violations,
especially when the state disciplinary systems generally view it as
the trial courts' responsibility to regulate the conduct before them.
20 8
Moreover, in the many instances where a federal court has adopted
the Model Rules as the standard of conduct for lawyers,20 9 the court
and the litigants are faced with the hypocrisy of a mandatory rule of
conduct specifying minimum standards-without the court's ability
to enforce the same, other than by referral to one of the disciplinary
agencies, which does not solve the immediate problem.21 °
Fourth, this separation has perpetuated a multitude of other sanc-
tions rules and statutes, which would be largely unnecessary if Civil
Rule 11 was standardized to follow the litigation ethics rules. It has
also resulted in the attempt to hold pro se litigants to the litigation
ethics rules, when they cannot possibly be expected to know or un-
derstand, let alone comply with, professional codes of conduct.211 If
Civil Rule 11 was correctly seen as the enforcement mechanism for
the litigation ethics rules, then it would be silly to truly believe that
lawyers' ethical rules can or should be applied to pro se litigants,
whose conduct should be regulated and sanctioned-but not by pro-
fessional standards applicable to lawyers. As a result, courts have
made all sorts of accommodations to pro se litigants in the Civil Rule
11 context,212 rather than just admitting that Civil Rule 11 is the
wrong vehicle to use against them.
Fifth, this separation has encouraged a dual, if not triple, track of
attorney discipline, whereby lawyers ostensibly are subject to disci-
pline under the state disciplinary systems, under the Civil Rule 11
207. See supra Part VII.
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt.
b (2000) ("Frivolous advocacy inflicts distress, wastes time, and causes in-
creased expense to the tribunal and adversaries and may achieve results for a
client that are unjust. Nonetheless, disciplinary enforcement against frivolous
litigation is rare. Most bar disciplinary agencies rely on the courts in which
litigation occurs to deal with abuse.").
209. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part V.
211. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 5.05[a] (discussing the differing applica-
tion of Civil Rule 11 to pro se litigants as compared to attorneys).
212. Id.
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procedure, and under the federal disciplinary system.213 But apart
from the limited referrals under Civil Rule 11,214 the regulatory
systems have been kept in the dark about the "civil misconduct" of
lawyers.21 5 Thus, rather than encouraging the unification of all sys-
tems affecting lawyer regulation,216 as recommended by the ABA's
McKay Report,217 this separation has perpetuated the multiple attor-
ney regulatory schemes, which seldom talk to each other.
218
Finally, it should be the province of a court to regulate the con-
duct of attorneys practicing before it, and to discipline them accord-
ingly, when needed, if for no other reason than that noted by Profes-
sor Kramer,2 19 which is that the state agencies are not set-up to police
litigation ethics violations, and they seldom do.220 In a unified disci-
plinary system, a Civil Rule 11 motion would take on the same posi-
tion as a grievance, and the resulting determination would be re-
ported to a central lawyer regulatory body, as suggested by Professor
Brown. 22 1 At the same time, under such a system, such "grievances"
would be waived if not litigated in the relevant court proceeding,
which would relieve state disciplinary agencies of the awful and
time-consuming task of trying to assess litigation conduct (when they
are asked to do so), when the courts are in the best position to do so
anyway. 222 Civil Rule 11 proceedings should be viewed as part-and-
parcel of lawyer regulation rather than as some sort of extra-
disciplinary proceeding that has nothing to do with the lawyer's li-
cense. As noted by Professor McMorrow, this is especially true, be-
213. See Joy, supra note 58.
214. See id. at 791-95.
215. See id. at 797-99.
216. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 1
(1999) (proposing a rule requiring a comprehensive lawyer regulatory system).
217. See also Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary En-
forcement: Lawyer Regulation for a New Century Recommendation 3.2
(A.B.A. 1992) [hereinafter McKay Report] (advocating a central intake office
for all complaints about lawyers).
218. See Joy, supra note 58, at 797-818.
219. See supra notes 137 & 143 and accompanying text.
220. Kramer, supra note 137, at 797-98.
221. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
222. See VAIRO, supra note 16, § 8.04[c][2] (discussing the primary role of
the district court in making findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as in
selecting the appropriate sanction).
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cause "[a]s the first public entity to see the manifestation of the law-
yer's conduct, it is probably inevitable that the courts will also be the
first line of defense against attorney abuse. 223
IX. PROPOSED 2003 VERSION OF CIVIL RULE 11
So what would Civil Rule 11 look like if it was amended to be-
come the vehicle to enforce the Model Rules in federal court?
Using the 1993 version of Civil Rule 11 as a template, the rule
might be amended as follows:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other
paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not repre-
sented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each
paper shall state the signer's law firm or other legal entity,
if applicable, address.--ad telephone number, facsimile
number, and e-mail address,-4-a-y as applicable. In addi-
tion, every pleading, amended pleading, dispositive motion,
and briefs or memorandums related to dispositive motions,
shall be signed by every party on whose behalf it is filed.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omis-
sion of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of attorney or party.
(b) Conduct of All Attorneys of Record. All attorneys of
record, as well as their law firms or other legal entities, if
applicable, shall complv at all times during the litigation
with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [op-
tion: substitute State Rules of Professional Conduct], as
amended and currently in force, especially, but not limited
to, the litigation ethics rules, Model Rules 3.1-3.4. No at-
torney shall appear in court or in any proceeding related to
the litigation, or otherwise participate in the same, without
first having filed a notice of appearance in the case. This
rule applies equally to a pro se party, who is also an attor-
ney licensed to practice law in any state or federal court.
223. McMorrow, supra note 19, at 979.
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All papers filed with the court or served on anyone by an at-
torney of record shall be served on each and every client
party of the attorney filing or serving such paper. and the
certificate of service shall so specifically state. This does
not mean that clients of opposing counsel shall be served in
this manner directly, which would violate Model Rule 4.2.
Instead, opposing counsel shall provide copies to their re-
spective clients within five (5) days of receipt thereof.
(bc)Representations to Court by Represented Party or
Non-Attorney Unrepresented Party. By presenting to the
court directly or through counsel (whether by signing, fil-
ing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written mo-
tion, or other paper, a party represented through counsel or
non-attorney an atemey ei-unrepresented party is certify-
ing that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivo-
lous argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are rea-
sonably based on a lack of information or belief.
All represented parties shall have an obligation to timely
read all court papers submitted to them by their attorneys of
record, and they shall have a duty to inform their attorneys
in writing if, in their opinion, any court papers do not fully
comply with this rule, so that such papers can be amended
or withdrawn in due course, and this duty continues until
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the conclusion of the litigation. It is assumed that unrepre-
sented parties shall have read what the have personally filed
or served. It is also acknowledged that the level of knowl-
edge, information, and belief that a party may have under
subsection (2) may vary considerably depending upon that
party's sophistication.
(ed) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportu-
nity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) or
(c) has been violated, the court may, subject to the condi-
tions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms or other legal entities, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or (c) or are responsible for
the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule
shall be made separately from other motions or requests
and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b) or (c. It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged
violation of the applicable Model Rule(s), or the chal-
lenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on
the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a law firm or other legal entity
shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed
by its partners, associates, and employees. Sanctions
against attorneys and their law firms or other legal entities
shall be measured and judged by the law of legal ethics &
professional responsibility, as well as the case law devel-
oped under this rule, and where applicable and not incon-
sistent, the case law developed under the previous ver-
sions of this rule. Sanctions against non-attorney parties
shall be judged by the case law developed under this rule,
and where applicable and not inconsistent, the case law
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developed under the previous versions of this rule, how-
ever, in the instance of monetary sanctions, such persons
may be sanctioned monetarily only as provided for in 28
U.S.C. § 1927.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the
court may enter an order describing the specific conduct
that appears to violate subdivision (b) or (c) and directing
an attorney, law firm or other legal entity, or party to
show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) or (c)
with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction im-
posed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what
is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or com-
parable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to
the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanc-
tion may consist of, or include, directives of a non-
monetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court,
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of
some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. In
the instance of non-attorney parties, they may be sanc-
tioned monetarily only as provided for in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
non-attorney represented party for a violation of subdivi-
sion (b)(2). Monetary sanctions may not be awarded
against a non-attorney unreresented party for a violation
of the same except as provided for in 28 U.S.C. & 1927.
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the
court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show
cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose at-
torneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall
describe the conduct determined to constitute a viola-
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tion of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed.
(de) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a)
through (4d_ of this rule do not apply to disclosures and dis-
covery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are
subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
This proposed amendment would achieve several goals:
First, it would require parties to actually sign all papers related
to pleadings and dispositive motions, which would reinforce the no-
tion that these are, in fact, their "claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions. 224
Second, it would define the conduct expected of attorneys of re-
cord as that required by the Model Rules, it would require attorneys
to be of record to take any action in a case, it would de-emphasize
the signature of the attorney in lieu of making all attorneys of record
responsible for compliance with the Model Rules during the case,
and it would specifically make Civil Rule 11 the mechanism
whereby the court would enforce the ethical obligations of lawyers to
the court, opposing counsel, and the parties. In addition, it would re-
quire the attorney of record to supply all court papers to his or her
client on a timely basis for review.
Third, it would make the 1993 version representations specifi-
cally applicable to all parties, it would require the parties to actually
read all of these court papers in a timely manner, and it would im-
pose the 1993 version duties on them, which would continue
throughout the case.
Fourth, it would adopt the law of legal ethics and professional
responsibility as well as the 1993 version case law on sanctions, and
where applicable and not inconsistent, the previous case law under
the rule. In addition, it would limit monetary sanctions against non-
attorney parties as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Given the amount of ground covered by the Model Rules, this
proposal may need revision after reflection as to the mechanics of the
proposal, but it would accomplish the following public policy objec-
tives:
1. It would allow the court to sanction attorneys of record for
224. FED. R. CIv. P. 1 I(b)(2).
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violations of the Model Rules;
2. It would allow the court to sanction parties for objectively
frivolous conduct; and
3. It would prevent the court from imposing monetary sanctions
against parties, unless they are found to have acted in bad-faith
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
It is submitted that this proposal would expand the duties and
obligations that could and should be enforced by the court, which
should result in greater litigation efficiency, while continuing to
make clear that monetary sanctions are disfavored, just as they are
under the current 1993 version of Civil Rule 11.
X. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the Model Rules define the conduct
required of all attorneys in and out of court, but Civil Rule 11 does
nothing but outlaw frivolous conduct and allow the court to sanction
the same. Surely, we can expect more from the courts in terms of
demanding full compliance with all legal ethics and professional
responsibility rules, and it seems odd that the courts have become
fixated on frivolous conduct, as if that is the only thing that is dan-
gerous to the legal system. When a lawyer fails to expedite litiga-
tion, lapses in his or her duty of candor, is unfair to the opposing
side, etc., all of these ethical violations should be just as sanctionable
as the violation of frivolous conduct. As we move into this new
millennium, we can and should demand more of the courts, as the
front line in battle so-to-speak, in enforcing ethical litigation
conduct.
While Civil Rule 11 should always have been interpreted in light
of the litigation ethics rules, that is not enough. Instead, Civil Rule
11 should be amended to allow the courts to require all attorneys of
record to do what they are already required to do: namely, to comply
fully with all of the ethical rules of the profession. It is hypocritical
for the courts not to enforce the ethical obligations of its officers-
those attorneys of record in cases before them. The things that courts
let attorneys get away with does far more damage to the image of the
legal profession than possibly anything else, and all any of us need
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do to confirm this is to talk to litigation clients about their experi-
ences.
2 2 5
225. See ROTUNDA, supra note 45, § 1-7 (discussing the public image of
lawyers).
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